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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
CONGESTION AND DELAY IN OUR COURTS
By THOMAS A. GILLIAM*
LAW SCHOOLS
Administration has a beginning, some organization and author-
ity, but to be effective, should include considerable participation
by those who are administered. Conceivably, this could be the
theme of a lecture on the subject in one of the law schools, for there
is where Chief Justice Warren has indicated a beginning should
be made:
A tremendous responsibility rests upon the lawyers to
make our system work, and we must develop in them a
crusading spirit. We must begin by developing in the law
student a real concept of the lawyer and judge in the ad-
ministration of justice. Unless they obtain a realistic un-
derstanding of the functioning of the courts, and unless
they are imbued with the zeal to make our courts function
better than at any other time in our history, we will con-
tinue to have these problems in aggravated form.
The time for such indoctrination is in the law schools.
Here is where future lawyers get their broad vision. Once
they are graduated and pass the Bar, interest becomes in-
creasingly circumscribed.'
As to method, probably the lecture would continue, students
may find that there is nothing new since Plato and Aristotle.2 Plato
felt that there was a perfect solution, conceived and administered
by philosopher-kings; Aristotle also felt that there was a solution,
not, however, within the grasp of anyone, but an Infinity, as it were,
approached by trial and error.
Whatever method, the lecturer may go on to say, one way of
approaching problems is to find causes first. Roscoe Pound, a young
professor speaking before the American Bar Convention of 1906,
listed several sources of dissatisfaction on the part of the public
with law administration.3 There are causes which arise out of any
legal system: the conflicts between generalization and uniqueness,
stability and public opinion; the difficulty of resolving these con-
flicts, the unpopular task of restraint. There is also a cause that
arises out of the Anglo-American common law system: the theory
that each, looking for his own, would vindicate public rights, re-
*Mr. Gilliam received the B.A. degree from Columbia University, 1941, the LL.B. degree from Yale
University, 1948, and the M.A. degree from the University of Colorado, 1949. He is an assistant city
attorney in Denver and attorney for the Urban Renewal Authority.
1 Address, Fleming Low Building Dedication, University of Colorado, June 24, 1959, 32 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 1, 6 (1959).
2 Hall, The Progress of American Jurisprudence in Harding, Justice in Retrospect, 24 (1957). Judge
Clark has expressed the Aristotelian method: "What we should do is work out what might be termed
working developments for improvements here and there." Proceedings of the Attorney General's
Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation, 10 (1956). Expressions of contrasting method
are: "our reforms are too trivial," Hollzer, Shall We Lead or Be Driven?, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 137, 138
(1930); and "palliatives and half-way measures are illusory," Perry, Politics and Judicial Administra-
lion, 17 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y. 133, 139 (1934).
3 Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 Am. L. Rev.
729 (1906), 8 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1956), and see Harding, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8-9.
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sulting in a contentiousness. There are causes unique to this coun-
try: the multiplicity of courts and the concurrency of jurisdiction,
principally state and federal. Then there are matters arising out
of the general social system, such as the citizen's aversion to jury
duty, the confusing character of legislation and politics.
Shortly after this speech, Pound was to attack again.4 The Field
Code5 had been scuttled, he wrote, because the judges who ad-
ministered it, preserved the dogmas of the older procedures when-
ever possible. American lawyers moreover, treated judicial admin-
istration as a game "to be played to the bitter end as a game of
football might be."'6 Nor was the public exempt; false ideals of
democracy could destroy the system. Here was an angry young
man, and, fortunately, they still exist in the law schools.
Having an analysis, he had a program. 7 There is a need for a
simplified court system with a flexibility in the assignment of
judges. The selection of judges should be taken out of ward politics.
Decisions should be on the merits. There should be an improvement
of public interest in jury service, and there should be a strengthen-
ing of bar responsibility. To this another scholar" added, in 1956:
restore the rule-making power of the courts; develop pre-trial and
discovery so as to minimize surprise and shorten trial by stipula-
tion; provide for an administrative judge, adequate judicial salaries
and retirement; establish judicial councils and conferences; and
reorganize municipal courts. With the exception of the federal
rules, the lecturer may conclude, much of this program has yet to
be realized in American courts.9
The student may ask: "If the program is already conceived, the
causes known, and methodology is as old as the Greeks, what is
there left to do?" Another may doubt that a problem exists: "While
the national average time in 1953 from issue to trial for a personal
injury jury trial was 11.5 months,1" it had dropped in 1958 to 9.4.11
In half the metropolitan areas studied in 1958, this interval was six
months or less,12 generally not regarded as excessive." And while,
in the federal courts, the median time interval for cases increased
from 8.9 months in 1958 to 10.3 in 1959,14 efforts are being made to
secure more judges,15 which is certainly the way to relieve con-
gestion."5 6 To this, the lecturer might reply, citing the Chief Justice,
with the challenge:
4 Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 III. L. Rev. 388, 390 (1909).
5 Original New York Code of Civil Procedure. "Fundamental American reform in procedure did
not come until the advent of David Dudley Field of New York, who narrowly escaped being the
greatest low reformer the world has ever seen," Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice-
Two Decades of Development, 26 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 155, 237 (1957). The Field Code adopted in New
York in 1848 contained 391 sections, which later grew to 3,397, Cummings, Immediate Problems for
the Bar, 20 A.B.A.J. 212, 213 (1934).
6 Pound, op. cit. supro note 4, at 391.
7 Elliott, Improvements in Judicial Administration 1906-1956, in Harding, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 43-44.
8 Id. at 44-46.
9 Simmons and Pryor, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, 36 Ia. L. Rev. 436 (1951);
Porter, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, The Extent of Their Acceptance, 36 A.B.A.J. 614
(1950).
10 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12.
11 Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation,
195 (1958).
12 Id. at 197.
13 Id. at 13.
14 1959 Dir. of the Ad. Office of U.S. Courts 11-23.
15 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 151-55.
16 "The one certain remedy for delay in any court system is the creation of a sufficient number of
additional judgeships and it needs no special study to tell us that," Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz,
Delay in the Court, 4 (1959).
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Our entire system of government is on trial - not only
as to its ability to meet problems to the satisfaction of our
people, but, also, to convince the world, which has its eyes
continually on us, that under free institutions which grow
and develop without compulsion, there can be efficiency
and dispatch in the handling of all the far-flung contro-
versies involving human affairs. Therefore, I urge that we
make the improvement of the administration of justice the
great central cause of our profession, and that all other
causes be made to conform to it.17
After class, discussion might continue as follows: law in any
system is bound inextricably with government; in a democracy, both
:seem dedicated to a reasonable reconciliation of the irreconcilable.
What a beautifully impossible thing the profession is. The indi-
vidual is paramount, the will of the majority is paramount."t Sta-
bility is to be desired; the law must respond to change.19 There
must be certainty, with an allowance for the unique.2 0 There must
be liberty, but there must be authority.2 1 There are personal rights,
and there are property rights.2 2 There must be justice but it is
17 Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A.J. 1043, 1046 (1958).
And see, Storey, Low and Lawyers in a Divided World, 1958, Wash. U.L.Q., 247, 249. Closer to home,
a question exists if settlement and jury waiver are not the result of delay and congestion in the
courts, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supro note 16, at 10, 105, i.e.-the wronged are forced to
Waive the right to trial, even if there should be no right to trial by jury in civil actions.
18 Pound, The Problem of an Ordered Society, 11 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1932).
19 Id. at 3.
20 Frank, Courts on Trial, 133 (1949).
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almost better to make a wrong decision than to be slow about it.2 3
The law, too specific, promotes evasion; but, too general is to evoke
dispute.2 4 Law is a science, the knowledge of which is to be gained
from books;25  law is the science of inefficiency; 26 law is an art
rather than a science, an art of the courts.2 7 Law is the only ma-
chine designed to go in all directions at one time.2
-8
And possibly a student program evolves. Comparative law
should be required. Ours is not the only democracy. We should
study the dawn of equity, a conscience that tore away folklore.
We should study Bentham," 9 Brougham,30 and the hanging judges.
We should know about the device of the Royal Commission,' the
recommendations of which were rarely ignored. 32  If the future
you want is that of a "client-caretaker" 33 rather than that of a trial
lawyer, what of the relative position of the barrister and solicitor
in England? 34 If you have doubt about your status or that of your
professors, compare that of their colleagues in Germany, the student
in France.35 We should have knowledge of the Spanish system,
the slowest and most formal in the world.36 We should know that
the Romans placed the highest officers of their state in the position
comparable to our judges in pre-trial.3 7 Why are legislators called
Solons? 38 Are we aware of the Greek's love of arbitration, 39 that
the science of Aristotle is obsolete but that his Politics and Ethics
are still revered?
40
It may be that law review articles contain too much substantive
law.' The cloistered atmosphere of the school might be dispelled;
it is as objectionable, perhaps, as marble courtrooms, the expense
of which may be why we do not have more. The school should be
in or accessible to a live courtroom, a lawyer's hospital.42 The school
should have a legal aid clinic. The school should have associates,
23 Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 Yale L. J. 28, 33 (1908).
24 Seagle, op. cit. supra note 21, at 30.
25 Yntema, The Purview of Revearch in the Administration of Justice, 16 Ia. L. R. 337, 351 (1931),
citing the Longelellian view.
26 Seagle, op. cit. supra note 21.
27 Frank, op. cit. supra note 20, at 221.
28 Seogle, op. cit. supro note 21, at 4.
29 See Rossman, How to Achieve Improvement in the Administration of Justice, 27 A.B.A.J. 754-55
(1941), citing Bentham's A Fragment of Government (1776) as criticizing the Commentaries; "Black-
stone's fundamental error was an antipathy to reform."
30 Whose speech in Parliament led to a report of a Royal Commission on delay, Harno, Whither
the Law?, 14 Ore. L. Rev. 187, 197 (1934).
31 E.g., First Report of the Commissioners, 9 (1869): "We are of the opinion that the defects
cannot be completely remedied by any mere transfer . . . of jurisdiction between the Courts . . and
that the first step . . . will be the consolidation of all Superior Courts of Law and Equity, together
with the Courts of Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty into one court . . . in which Court shall be vested
all the jurisdiction which is now exercisable by each . . . with power, however, to the Supreme Court
to vary . . . this classification . . . as may . . . be deemed expedient."
32 A report not accepted: "We recommend that the County Courts should be annexed to and form
constituent parts or branches of the proposed High Court of Justice." Second Report (1872).
33 Attributed to Professor Kales, Pound op. cit. supra note 4, at 399.
34 Callison, Courts of Injustice, 155, 689-90 (1956).
35 Id. at 717.
36 Fournier, Judicial Administration in Latin America, in Harding, op. cit. supra note 2, at 91, 93.
Jury trial has highly limited use, Clagett, Administration of Justice in Latin America, 117 (1952).
37 Kocourek, Speedy Justice in Ancient Rome. 5 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 101. 103 (1921).
38 "Some critics believed that the indefiniteness of the laws of Solon was responsible for much
unnecessary litigation. Aristotle found no justification in this criticism." Banner and Smith, The Admin-
istration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, 325 (1930).
39 Id. at 29, 349.
40 Yntema, op. cit. supra note 25, at 350.
41 Proceedings, op. cit supra note 11, at 96.
42 It has been suggested that federal and state courts be in one building or adjacent (together
with investigatory agencies), Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45. It has also been urged that
diversity, the present meeting ground of federal-state jurisdiction, be abolished, id. at 63.
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active in trial practice. Indeed, if the school is truly a law center,
the local bar would have its offices there, and the executive sec-
retary has entered the discussion. He is interested in what the
participants do after they pass their bar examinations.
BAR ASSOCIATIONS
43
Increasingly, he points out, a fledgling doesn't go it alone but
joins a flock.44 Whatever their choice of career, all should be re-
quired, at least, to join the association. An integrated bar is as
important as an integrated court 45 if something is to be done about
delay. A lawyer alone can furnish little direction and restraint as
to the multitude of collections which are swamping the courts. And
the junior bar is foremost in reform of that Leviathan, the muni-
cipal court, the only court which most citizens see.46 An internship
with a trial practitioner should, perhaps, be requisite. Some now
meet this requirement by defense of the indigent in federal courts;
some become deputy D.A.'s. But the way that one used to become
a lawyer was as an apprentice. Reform requires more formal edu-
cation; 47 there can, however, never be enough experience. And the
longer one delays his debut, the more unlikely it is that he will risk
embarrassment. Stage fright as well as economics keeps attorneys
in their offices.
48
Some go in with their dads and try a little supervision there.
There is a story of a father who was so dismayed as to exclaim,
when his son burst in to announce he had settled the Frothingham
estate: "I was saving that for you as a legacy!" In a divorce prac-
tice, on the other hand, some spend as little time in the office as is
required to draw the complaint, and as much time in court as it
takes to ferret out the blame that determines the alimony49 and
the fee. The ethic is otherwise. A divorce lawyer should be well
paid as a conciliator. As such, he will file fewer complaints, the
hearing of which requires the special assignment of a judge.'0 And
why is conciliation confined to domestic relations? How about ask-
ing business clients if a knowledgeable friend can't settle their
disputes? Why overload the courts, or force a system of commercial
arbitration? l You would not lose a client, but gain at least three
who will bring in more important matters, including divorce and
probate.
In a negligence matter, if a client comes in who had a fall in a
theater, you probably can get a prompt settlement out of your in-
surance lawyer friend. If the client returns after a fall in a depart-
43 That attention be directed to the time a case begins in the lawyer's office has been mentioned,
Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 18.
44 "The increasing preference in this country for corporation over trial practice is highly signifi.
cant," Yntemo, op. cit. supro note 25, at 338.
45 "The organization of judges io equalize their work, to permit of cooperation between them, to
allow each of them to perform the kind of judicial work for which he is best qualified, to classify
the kinds of judicial work, is the soul of the unified court idea, which is accepted throughout the
country the cornerstone of judicial reform and integration." McChesney, Efficient Administration of
Justice, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 14, 15 (1920).
40Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 100.
47 Kirkwood, Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 14 Ore. L. R. 42 (1934).4S Some procrastination results through fear of defeat, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 47.
41: Hostadter and Herzog, Common Sense About Alimony, Harper's, May, 1958, p. 68.
5t Boies, The Executive Judge, 167 Annals 12, 21-22 (1933).
51 In Pennsylvania, however, a successful system of compulsory arbitration has been adopted, by
statutory amendment, enlisting panels of 3 attorneys, to determine cases of $1000.00 or less, with an
appeal to a jury if the panels' fees are paid. Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 117-25; Proceed-
ings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 113 and July 1, 1956 Inst. of Jud. Ad., Compulsory Arbitration.
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ment store, and you take the case, you have a lawsuit of doubtful
propriety. Champerty and maintenance are ancient sins and in a
modern society they are vicious. Realistic costs assessed to the
losing party have been suggested as a means of eliminating nuisance
litigation.5 2 Any resulting inequity must be weighed with the pro-
priety of the contingency fee.
But suppose you have a bona fide complainant: should an action
be instituted? In view of what happens to litigation later,
53  it
would seem that the ethic of conciliation should be extended fur-
ther. Surely a judicious claim letter, to be followed by a conference
between attorneys, would not be an indecent requirement.54  But
even though preliminaries fail, the summons has been personally
served.55 The defense responds and is often represented by the
corporation lawyer. What direction should he have? Here bar su-
pervision may be inadequate. For although the organization man
is always a member of bar associations, his own in-group may com-
mand his loyalties. Here the sins are of omission rather than com-
mission. For example, a junior may be sent to a pre-trial without
any authority to settle,56 and prolonged litigation may be referred to
a specialist trial bar.57 And there is the federal attorney, who hides
in the robes of the sovereign.58 Lawyers have loyalties which con-
flict with the bar's ideals. We need more supervision than we can
supply, the association man concludes, and he defers to the trial
judge.
JUDGES
Other than as a "fledgling," his honor feels, the loneliest position
a lawyer attains is upon his elevation to the bench. Every judge
needs a law clerk if he would have him. Where this residency has
been tried, tradition has it that there be but one assistant. Possibly
a judge needs, however, several points of view. A year or so in the
shadow of the bench is also traditional, but a lifelong partnership
may develop. There seems no reason why the clerk could not have
5 A high filing fee for a jury and substantial costs if verdict is less than pre-trial figure or
jurisdiction of the court has been suggested, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 2, at 94; see also, Finch,
Excessive Litigation, 19, J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 24, 25 (1935); Dayton, Costs, Fees and Expenses in Litiga-
tion, 167 Annals 32 (1933).
53 71% of the cases in the New York Supreme Court are settled without trial and require 16.2%
of the court's time, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 16, at 5.
54 While in the New York Supreme Court, 37% of pre-trials end in settlement, id. at 142; the
question is whether they would have been settled anyway, id. at 143. New Jersey requires a confer-
ence of attorneys before each pre-trial, the attorneys submitting a memo of agreement (and briefs if
ordered) Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litiga-
tion, 86-87 (1956). It has been said, however, that the essence of pre-trial is two intelligent lawyers
and a good judge, and if the lawyers are intelligent you don't need pre-trial. Proceedings, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 95.
55 Ransom, Improving the Administration of Justice, 20 J. Am. Judu. Soc'y 222, 231-32 (1937).
An alternative is that process issue at any office, Second Report, op. cit. supro note 32, at 19.
56 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 111, 155. One court, where an attorney has no authority
to speak, has reached a recommended figure and the case marked settled, with the burden upon the
attorney to restore the case to the trial calendar. Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 11, at 48.
57 In one major cilty 2% of the defense firms handle 34.3% of all cases, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz,
op. cit. supra 16, at 193.
58 The Department of Justice gives priority to government cases involving the payment of interest
from the time of taking; and U. S. attorneys have been given much more extensive power to settle,
but where they don't want to make a settlement the tendency is to blame Washington for delay.
Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 11, at 83-84. Charging interest from date of injury is felt to affect
only the price of settlements in private cases and not their frequency, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 133.
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a court career, with promotion to referee or master,5 9 and eligibility
to succeed his mentor in the great task of justice.
It has been thought that state judges, at least, have lost common
law command.60 This may be so in jury trials, but most cases never
reach the jury, far less trial.61 It is in this area that the court may
exercise supervision to eliminate delay.62 For example, dilatory
motions are still common. 3 A rule that all motions be accompanied
by briefs may discourage this practice.6 ' In some cases there is no
dispute on the facts. And yet it is extraordinary how appellate
courts frown at summary judgment.6 5 In others, an authoritative
decision by a court of last resort is all that is desired by the parties.
In such cases, where the facts are stipuated, original jurisdiction for
a declaratory judgment by such court might be provided. In other
cases, an answer to a question of law may aid decision of even dis-
puted facts. Interlocutory certification of such questions to a high-
er court might be allowed.6 6 Delay occurs if reviewing courts can-
not resolve issues without retrial, or at least retrial of the whole
case.
67
The rule-making authority should be given to, and exercised
by, the courts without legislative outline."' And stare decisis, while
indispensible perhaps to a stable society, should never, perhaps,
have been extended to the rules.69 Flexibility is essential. For ex-
ample, some courts find it desirable that one judge handle all pre-
liminary matters and that others try the cases; 7 others find bene-
ficial results in abandoning this process, permitting judges to han-
dle their cases from start to finish.7 1 Possibly in any event there
should be a commission with the continuing task of reviewing the
rules so as to remove delay.
72
Effective supervision, of course, also derives from consolidating
courts. '7 3 Reorganization and redistricting within a state
4 or a city7 5
has been found acceptable, with New Jersey taking the lead in
59 It has been recently suggested that the use of masters is second class justice and an abdication
of the court function, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 16, at 16-17; and see. La Buy v.
Howes Heather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957). An Anglican view is that much reliance should be made
on referees, subject to the court's power to require explanotion, and that there should be much use of
affidavits subject to the power of the court to require attendance for cross-examination. First Report,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 14. Pro-tem judges, on the other hand, are not always satisfactory. Proceed.
ings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 18.
60 Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 III. L. Rev. 399 (1909).
61 Not quite 5 out of 100 personal injury cases reach trial and not quite 2 are tried to comple-
tion, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholzo, op. cit. supro note 16, at 14.
62 Trials are the exceptional, not normal, business, Proceedings of the Attorney General's Confer-
ence on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation, 17 (1958).
63 Id. at 93.
64 Such a rule has been adopted in a court in the writer's state and some others.
65 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 85; and Skeel, Every Day Is "Law Day," 7 Clev-Mar. L.
Rev. 558, 563 (1958) where summary judgment is rated as a remedy with pre-trial. But see dissent of
L. Hand, J., in California Apparel Creators v. Weider of California, 162 F.2d 893, 903 (2nd Cir. 1947).
66 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 170.
67 Sunderland, Improving tte Administration of Civil Justice, 167 Annals 60, 65 (1933), but see
Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1912), id. at 76.
69 Statutory provision as to the distribution of business should be held directory and not manda-
tory, id. at 68.
69 Sunderland, Progress Toward a Better Administration of Justice, 17 J. Am. Jud. Sec'y 49, 51
(1933).
70 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 43.
71 E.g. Dade County (Miami) Florida, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 15; Proceedings, op.
cit. supra note 54, at 108. Vanderbilt, on the other hand, took a dim view of separate calendars,
Impasses in Justice, 1956 Wash. U. L. Q. 267, 287.
72 Such as the California Judicial Council, Callison, op. cit. supro note 34, at 640; the English
Rules Committee, id. at 699; and see Sunderland op. cit. supro note 69, at 52.
73 Probably the most complete proposal is outlined in The State-wide Judicature Act, 13 Am. Jud.
Soc'y 10 (1917); and see earlier 34 A.B.A. Rep. 578 (1909).
74 See 49. Vanderbilt, op. cit. supra note 5, at 209-32, describing the New Jersey system.
75 Boies, op. cit. supra note 50, analyzing three integated metropolitan courts and concluding that
common to each were executive judges with district and exclusive control together with detailed and
frequent reports, constant diagnosis, id. at 22-23.
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state administration under a chief justice selected for his adminis-
trative abilities, who appoints (and removes) presiding judges be-
low him.76 There, rules of court, not subject to legislative veto, pro-
vide the framework for a system wherein judges who can be spared
from regular duties are assigned where they are needed. 77 Similar
business-like administration has been achieved in Massachusetts 7
and Puerto Rico.7 9 And professional administrators, the by-product
of the current concern as to congestion," discover many personal
as well as statistical things about the judicial process. For example,
the efficiency of judges varies."1 Weekly reports, circulated to show
work loads, are designed to awaken some colleagues from lethargy
2
The role of an administrator is hard, however; one recently re-
marked: "Everyone believes in judicial administration. For the
other guy!"8 3 Alternatives include the borrowing of judges on a
voluntary basis, 4 longer court hours," night sessions, 6 shorter va-
cations, 7 and more judges,"" or their prompt appointment when
vacancies exist.8 9
Preparation by judges as well as advocates also would seem
desirable. As a mutual aid. Judge Ira Jayne of Detroit felt that an
informal conference with the attorneys might prove helpful.90 So
successful was the result that the method seems well recommended
for universal attention. If pre-trial is to be criticized, however, it is,
possibly, the formalism which attends its use. The original inspira-
tion seems lacking in a stereotyped treatment. Probably several
such conferences are needed, nevertheless, in long and drawn-out
76 Proceeding, op. cit. supra note 62, at 72.
77 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 81.
78 Whose novelty includes oral depositions before trial and use of auditors in motor vehirle tort
cases, Reardon, Civil Docket Congestion: A Massachusetts Answer, 39 .U. L. Rev. 297, 305 (1959).
79 Where a system of "At Large Judges" enables the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
substitute for regular judges on vacation or sick leave and to cover vacancies until they are filled.
Short assignments are covered by judges from neighboring parts of the some court. Institute of
Judicial Ad., Court Administration, 37-38, Aug. 1, 1955. The greatest obstacle to business administration
of the courts is their traditional independence. Even New Jersey has no common budget, Chandler,
McConnell & Tolman, Administering the Courts - Federal, State and Local, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 13,
16 (1958).
S0 Since the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws aparoved in 1948, a Model Act
to provide for on Administrator for the State Courts, by 1955 some 16 states and territories have
established administrative offices, Institute of Judicial Ad., op. cit. supra note 79, at 1.
8tA study showed such variance between individual judges as to suggest personal matters affect-
ing efficiency, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the Court, 14 (1959).
82 Judge Clark has remarked: "Part of my job is to try to calm down the ruffled feelings of
the Federal judges who get excited when they .et these statistics ... independence of the judiciarv
is one of the most sacred, one of our most vital things; but I don't think we need it quite so much
that it results from independence ... from our colleagues." Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 54,
at 26. See also, Vanderbilt, Our Main Order of Business: The Administration of Justice, 24 A.B.A.J.
187, 189 (1938), for a more directive approach.
831nterview. In the federal courts administration is a good deal honorary, Proceedings, op. cit.
supro note 54, at 25. The Model Court Administrator Act of 1948 was adopted in Michigan in 1952,
id. at 150-51.
84 Transfer of a judge doesn't exist in most states except by consent, first by his presiding judge
or the presiding judge where he is going, or all three, Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 62, at 69;
similar procedure exists with reference to federal judges, id. at 166.
85 Using New Jersey as the "upper limit of what could be expected under the most intensive
supervision and administration," Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 176, it was
discovered that the average number of court hours a day in New York was 4.1, id. at 181, as
compared to New Jersey's 4.5, but resulting in 19% more trial time per year than New York,
id. at 186.
86 Clark attributes to Augustus Hand the suggestion that a few evening sessions is the remedy,
Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 33.
87 A 1956 summer session in New Jersey removed 13-14% of the backlog, but in 1957 there was
only a token session, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 179.
88 The most recent study concluded that there are three ways of reducing cases which take judge
time: (1) shorten time for disposition, (2) increase settlement ratio, and (3) add judges or increase
efficiency, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 5. For caveat as to too many more
judges see Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 138.
89 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 45. A related problem is getting judges eligible for
retirement to move over, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 18.
90 Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 62, at 16.
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cases.'1 This enables the discovery procedure to be mapped out, and
voluminous non-contested documents to be received by the court,
with a running, patient explanation of them from counsel. The
judge becomes acquainted with, and should try, the case.
2
Pre-trial is often a catalyst to settlement.93 A participating law-
yer suddenly perceives that he has no case. The client should prob-
ably not be present when this insight is gained-he may delay the
moment of truth. How far the court should prompt settlement of
legitimate claims, however, is debatable. Some judges complain
they feel like claim adjusters.9 4 The propriety of a trial judge in-
volved in pre-trial which also involved potential settlement has
also been questioned.9 5 While conciliation may be properly the re-
sponsibility of the bench as well as the bar, a judge will suggest
settlement no further, perhaps, than is his inclination. And, possi-
bly, the atmosphere should not be strained or a great idea may be-
come lost. One court, moreover, has periodically blitzed its backlog
with wholesale pre-trials.9 Hurried justice as a solution to delayed
justice does not recommend itself except, possibly, as a desperation
measure. It would seem that the extended use of pre-trials should
91 Litigants must be assured, however, that initial particularization of issues will not preclude
amendment at a later date, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 37.
92 Id. at 86.
9-i Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supro note 81, at 143.
94 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 17.
95 Proceedings, pp. cit. supra note 62, at 138.
96 Connecticut, id. at 147. Backlogs may, however, hove limited significance since only a fraction
of such suits reach trial stage, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 44. As an
alternative the New York Supreme Court has permitted delay to accrue only in personal injury jury
litigation, id. at 7; preferential calendaring, except in hardship cases, has been criticized, however,
id. at 47.
IF ... you have talent as a writer and researcher;
IF ... you want certainty of income;
IF ... you desire the security afforded by employment
with a long-established law book publisher;
IF ... you would like to live and work in one of the
world's great cosmopolitan cities:
... write to the Editorial Department of this com-
pany and ask about employment opportunities.
BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY
McAllister and Hyde Streets
SAN FRANCISCO 1, CALIFORNIA
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vary; in some cases more time may be devoted to them than the
expenditure of judge-time warrantsY
7
Many cases, fortunately, are settled before their assignment to
be tried.98 Unfortunately, settlements, reached on the eve of, or
during, trial, disrupt schedules or are otherwise time-consuming. 99
A system to handle cases which go off, or are continued, must be
devised.10 0 Should continuances be allowed because a lawyer is too
busy? One court ruled that lawyers with too many cases are dis-
allowed continuances.'0 1 Perhaps, also, the client should affirma-
tively accede in some way. His lawyer, consulting personal inter-
ests, such as spreading income and workload, may be telling him
that they can't get to trial because of congested dockets. 10 2 If a gap
in trial scheduling may be filled, however, a continuance may not
matter,113 apart from the fact that the further delayed the immin-
ence of trial, the less likelihood of settlement. 04 Some courts fill
the gaps by assigning more cases than can conveniently be tried.
Without some statistical support, this procedure may add to con-
gestion.'",
Personal supervision rather than automation being given by the
judge to the administration of his court may solve this delicate mat-
ter of timing,'0 6 often lost in the long stately corridors which sep-
arate chambers from clerical offices. The rules, moreover, for the
service of subpoenas and like papers, ignore modern inventions.
The telephone (a first call to put witnesses on notice, a second to
get him to court) and the telegraph could be put to advantageous
use.1' 7 Consolidation of claims arising out of a common disaster has
also saved judge-years. 08 And note how judges in the Southern
District of New York have taken personal interest in strategic
docketing. 10 9 No case is docketed for jury trial without there being
97 A recent study concluded that pre-trial is effective only so far as its use is not offset by loss
of judge-time, id. at 12. In New Jersey pre-trial is compulsory in all upper trial courts except in
matrimonial and summary matters, Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 54, at 85; California has followed
suit, Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 62, at 110.
98 In the New York Supreme Court, it was found that 64% of all calendars was settled; 70%
personal injury (jury), 47%, personal injury (non-jury); 60%, general cases (jury), 64%, general cases
(non-jury). Zeise , Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 32. The 64% settled before assign-
ment for trial took 11% of the courts' time; the 36% assigned took the balance of time, and half
of these being settled after assignment took 1/3 court time, id. at 38. In the United States, on the
average, 1/5 of personal injury claims ore filed, 5% reach trial and 2 or 3% reach verdict or
judgment, id. at 105.
99 In the New York Supreme Court, it was estimated that 47% of personal injury trials are
settled after trial commenced and take nearly 1/2 court time spent on such cases, id. at 107.
100 Phillips, Better Court Administration . . . A Challenge to the Bench and Bar, 39 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 9. 12 (1955).
101 District Court of District of Columbia, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 54, at 37, 140. 5% of
the lawyers practicing before the New York Supreme Court had 20% of the trial appearances, Zeisel,
Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 15. And see Gray v. Gray, 6 ,I., App.2d 571, 128 N.
E.2d 602 (1955).
102 Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 54.
103 Id. at 53. What matters in the end is not the average ratio of lawyers to cases, but the
-chance of conflict if cases are assigned at random, id. at 196.
104 Id. at 60.
105 In the absence of calendar commissioners such as exist in the Federal District Court, S.D.N.Y.,
attorneys spend a lot of time answering calendars, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 145.
106 The Maryland Federal District Court has met the problem by (1) frequent calls of the docket
with cases definitely assigned for trial; (2) refusal to grant postponements; (3) time timits for
filing pre-trial motions to curb "monstrous abuse" of discovery proceedings; (4) required pre-trial
for cases taking more than two days; (5) prompt default of non-contested governmental civil cases;
and (6) long hours and short vacations, Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Court
.Congestion and Delay in Litigation, 54 (1956). In the District of Columbia, witnesses are subpoenaed
for 9 in the morning, and at 9:30 there is a roll call of attorneys who are present unless they call
in at 9:15 to say that they are ready. The chief judge makes his assignments and trials are at
10 o'clock, id. at 121.
107 Ransom, Improving the Administration of Justice, 20 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 231-32 (1937).
108 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 62, at 48.
109 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 106, at 24. There is a shying away, however, from even this
enthusiasm. Chief Judge Clark has said: "I try to restrain them because while it is a splendid job,
-we need to know what it means and the limitations," Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 106, at 25.
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filed a certificate (of readiness) that discovery is complete and that
settlement efforts have failed. °10 With these remarks the judge




Counsel begins irrepressibly. The judge is in his courtroom.
Along come the jurors, 1 - 2 - 3. Who are these trespassers upon
sacred precincts? Are not they the cause of delay?1 1 2  The jury,
however, is as old as civilization. Sense the drama of ancient
Greece when 6000 jurors attended a citizen's cause!1 13 Who are
they now? Or, who should they be? Better jurors are possibly as
important to the administration of justice as are better judges and
lawyers. While reform hovers around the idea of blue ribbon
juries,"4  rarely are men judged by an elite few. Perhaps, to be
representative, a box should be made up from all walks of life, and
exemptions pared to the bone.11 5
What role should lawyers play in jury selection? Possibly,
only a small part. The hours and sometimes days and even weeks
taken in voir dire may be wasted efforts on a client's behalf. For
attorneys, if they would attend occasionally the other social dis-
ciplines, may learn that you cannot judge a man by his appearance,
nor the impression you make by a prolonged examination. Some-
time, after the judge has made sure there isn't some obvious mons-
ter in the box, try but a glance at the veniremen and accept their
company with pleasure. Let the other guy display, if he will, his
distrust in his fellow man.
The jury is impaneled, and there are a few opening remarks to
110 The certificate of readiness in the New York Supreme Court resulted in not only a temporary but
also permanent reduction of commercial filings, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supro note 81,
at 13, 160-66.
111 A bench trial averages 50% less time than a jury trial, id. at 72, and the remedy for delay,
to be significant, must be aimed primarily at time-consuming depositions, id. at 25. Other than
abolition, the alternative to speedier jury trials is to encourage waiver. Any increase in waiver,
however, is unlikely as long as the parties feel, with justification, that judges decide differently
from juries, id. at 9-10, 87, even if the comparative was substituted for contributory negligence
rule, id. at 90-91. Moreover, jury trials seem to differ intrinsically from bench trials and are
characterized by more witnesses and longer cases, id. at 73. That greater attention be given to
trial practice has been urged in A.B.A., The Improvement of the Administration of Justice, A Hand-
book Prepared by the Section of Judicial Ad., 55-56 (3rd ed. 1952).
112 Callison, Courts of Injustice, 412 (1956).
113 Banner & Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, 365 (1930).
114 Callison, op. cit. supra note 112, at 92. Special interrogatories with the general verdict have
also been suggested, A.B.A. Handbook, op. cit. supra note 111, at 57; also, the use of jury commis-
sions appointed by courts, Otis, Improving the Administration of Justice, A Bill of Particulars, 28
A.B.A.J. 367 (1942).
115Some Suggestions for Improving the Administration of Justice in Oregon, a report of the
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acquaint these strangers with your cause. The most difficult side
is the positive; you don't have to be so well prepared to espouse the
negative. Good preparation produces brief speeches. The days of
oratory are over. Great moments in a play are only a few to be
effective. Rehearse your witnesses to take your occasional cue so
as not to color their stories or violate the rules. The jury is a camera
through which a world is watching. The judge, too, his interest
captured, will participate, recessing at the high points, and allowing
the jurors a chance for a quick smoke in the halls and to become
gently absorbed in other troubles besides their own. The great
weariness that judges sometimes display is because they've seen
too many bad plays.
While the opening theme is being developed, the overtones of
doubt must be blended in, the counterpoint suggested almost from
the beginning. The Thomases on the jury, however, must be en-
couraged ever so slightly. Does objection do it?" 6 It may empha-
size the objectionable point, particularly if you are overruled. Even
if sustained, imaginations invent more than what is being kept from
them. And, if long chamber interludes occur, you, their author,
upon return may become the victim of boredom. A glance of pity
may be worth more than objection as to incompetency; a shrug of
the shoulders, more than insistence upon irrelevancy; fascination
with the glorious day outside, more than arguing with the judge
and the jury as to what they think is material. A lawyer who is a
gratifying gladiator to his client may lose his case. Be still. Let
your mind wander visibly while your opponent is making good, to
return with interest while he is floundering.
And when it is your turn with his witness can you administer
the supervision of self-restraint? Decline the opportunity if you've
really nothing to offer in rebutal. Cross-examination is an art.
Don't muddy the canvas. If you think the witness is lying, you're
good if you can prove it to everyone's satisfaction. If you aren't
that good, don't take the court's time and the jurors' in attempting
to do the impossible. Sometimes, of course, you can prove the wit-
ness is a liar. Do it quickly as if you were administering a coup de
grace. Don't let him suffer. Cross-examine as if you were using a
few deft strokes of the brush. You don't have to ruin the picture.
And never etch or re-do your opponent's offering in clearer and
finer detail.
The court should be able to vary the order of proof. Except in
criminal matters, there is no vested right in what is done first. Some
judges in negligence cases, where they see from what's been pre-
sented that they may grant a directed verdict, have required proof
of liability first. 1 7 This is to avoid the detailed proof of injuries,
proof which may be unnecessary. Some courts have employed the
impartial medical expert, a method which either results in no trial1, '
or, possibly, a third opinion.
116 Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 III. L. Rev. 391 (1909).
117 Proceedings, op. cit supra note 106, at 33. Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45
A.B.A.J. 1265 (1959). In 40% of all personal injury suits tried to completion, the verdict is for the
defendant, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 99.
118 In a New York court it was found that use of such pane reduces cases going to trial by
24.30%. affecting primarily those cases which would have been settled during trial, Zeisel, Kalven
& Buchholz, op. cit. supro note 81, at 123. Baltimore and Philadelphia have established similar
panels, Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litiga-
tion, 77 (1958).
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Should the charge be made before or after counsels' summation,
and should the judge comment upon the evidence?"" In the federal
courts he charges afterward and may comment, in doing so, upon
evidentiary matters,-and he often does. What degree of control
the judge exercises in jury trials is, of course, significant, since such
cases take so much time."10 If counsel fail to exercise restraint, the
judge must restrain them. 12 1 His authority to do so ought hardly
ever be questioned by appellate courts, since in him is reposed the
primary responsibility for the administration of justice.122 The
tyrannical judge, should the jury fail, or not dare, mark his unfair-
ness, will be reversed. Again, court reporting fails to note recent
changes. The tape recorder, or even the movie," 3 if demeanor be
really felt important, would be a means of reducing delay. Little
or none of the record accompanies jurors in their seclusion.1
24 If
they could also review the case in the light of law, some better and
quicker results, and some finality, may be obtainable.
CHALLENGE
1 2 5
To reduce delay effectively, there must be communication with
the layman.12 This is a challenge to those who adminster the law.
There is a danger that we have grown too ingrown. Being able to
grasp but a part of the law ourselves, we feel that others would not
understand us or would not really care to. Compared to the busi-
nessman, we are thought of as going at a snail's pace. The new hero
of the hour is the "Man of Science.' 1 27 Even the social scientists
look at us as if we were some ancient druids worshipping at a for-
saken altar. We must enlist public concern as to court congestion,
without, however, belittling ourselves while we are about it. We
must educate our friends as to what the courts are doing with small
material resource.12 The courts' business is big business.'29 Science
or art, the law treats ills which are very deadly. Solutions of con-
flicts are reached in lawyers' offices, judges' chambers, and court-
rooms daily, while other disciplines seem merely to describe them,
possibly on the theory that solutions are unscientific.
Every challenge has dangers. There is a danger, in fighting a
disease, that the patient becomes ill from the cure. Some pills are
too hard to swallow. The jury is inefficient; its abolition has been
advocated, except as to major crimes. 130 A man's fortune, or lack of
119 Even while adopting a statute giving the rule-making power to the courts, the legislators of
one state prohibited their comment upon evidence, Blount, Improving the Administration of Justice,
27 A.B.A.J. 158 (1941).
120 Supro note 111.
121 Counsel wrangling and repetitive cross-examination suggest greater degree of judicial control
be exercised in consolidated trials as contrasted with others, Zeisel, Kolven & Buchholz, op. cit. supro
note 81, at 101; and evidence indicates that control tightens as the burden of trial increases, id. at 102.
122 Trials are the exceptional, not normal, business, Proceedings of the Attorney General's Con-
ference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation, 17 (1958), and see Carey, Why Not Trust the
Courts? 12 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 91, 93 (1928).
123 Frank, Courts On Trial, 422-23 (1949).
124 Ransom, op. cit. supra note 107, at 232.
125 The necessity of an overall philosophy, what to do about problem after realization of solu-
tions, has been felt, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 106, at 48.
126 See Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 106, at 89 to this effect, and that there is no single
panacea, id. at 90. "The judicial process remains just as much of a mystery to the layman, regard-
ess of pre-trial conferences and whether the Supreme Court or the legislature has the rule making
power," Stephens, Counsel May Proceed, 27 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 127 (1943).
127 Pilpel, The Job the Lawyers Shirk, Harper's Jan. 1960, p. 67.
128 In the whole judicial arm of the government there is one-fortieth as many employees as the
V.A., Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 106, at 51.
129 Simms, Speed in the Administration of Justice, 16 A.B.A.J. 290 (1930).
130 Callison, op. cit. supra note 112, at 465. Frank, op. cit. supra note 123, at 422-23. In New
York it was estimated that the addition of judges would equal the same result as abolition of this
basic institution, Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, op. cit. supra note 81, at 9.
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it, however, may mean his life and liberty. A jury may be but a
symbol of government; nevertheless, there is a response to sym-
bols."' Again, Judge Vanderbilt advocated integration of the
courts.1 32 And theoretically, if federal and state, if indeed all, juris-
dictions were abolished, advantages would accrue. There would be
one great court with tiers from appellate to the lowest. Adminis-
tration would be centralized at the top and at all levels. Waste of
judicial power would be minimized by free assignment of judges.
The records would be of one court, with a highly competent staff
and uniform statistics to assist the judges. Too great centralization,
however, brings about new problems of inefficiency, loss of initia-
tive, and a threat to independence.
1 33
That which the federal judges are evolving: control by the
circuit judicial councils; staff, statistics and surveys from the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts; and development
of policy by the Judicial Conference -seems to be a democratic
supervision for, at least, part of the system.134 As for the states, a
national conference of state trial judges would seem to be a step
forward. 13 -5  The collection of data by the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration, 136 being prepared by a growing group of judicial ad-
ministrators,137 is potentially capable of service comparable to that
of the Administrative Office. The administrators furnish forms to
local court clerical offices for reports in order to discover the back-
breaking backlogs and the record new filings with which metropoli-
tan judges have had to contend. 13  The reports give directions to
the willing help, in the main voluntary, by rural and suburban
judges.' 39 And the Attorney General's Conference on Congestion
131 Arnold, Symbols of Government (1935).
132 Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice - Two Decades of Development, 26 U.
Cinc. L. Rev. 209-10 (1957).
133 Haines, The General Structure of Court Organization, 167 Annals 1, 5-6 (1933). In the early
drafts, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts was to be vested with large powers
under general supervision of the Supreme Court. Senior Circuit Judge Kimbrough Stone (8th Cir.)
testified: "Lost year's bill has a provision in it which I personally thought was exceedingly danger-
ous, because I thought it might be construed to centralize here in Washington . . . (power)."
Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 59.
134Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 118, at 23-24. The Administrative Office has never been
adequately staffed to make the surveys, which are the necessary basis for orders of the judicial
councils of the circuits, id. at 25.
135 Id. at 106.
136 Id. at 12.
137 Institute of Judicial Ad., Court Administration, 37-8, Aug. 1, 1955.
13R See Institute of Judicial Ad., Delay and Congestion in State Metropolitan Trial Courts, May
21, 1956. Venue in tort cases where the tort occurred has been suggested to relieve metropolitan
courts. Proceedings, op. cit. supro note 118, at 172.
139 Administration remains, however, characterized by three types: autonomous system (chief is
really only the chairman of the supreme court); facade system (chief elected by colleagues); and the
seniority or senility system, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 70-71.
attorneys who want service
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and Delay is becoming the ministry of justice, dreamed of by Car-
dozo' 40 and Pound.
141
There is a danger, nevertheless, that with these steps we stop.
We have lost part of the law in the past to administrative boards.'
4 '
We have misunderstood the challenge, and have been misunder-
stood. One of the refuted claims for superiority of the administra-
tive process was a reputedly cheap and speedy justice.143 Another
is expertise,144 as if the courts could not gather to their delibera-
tions competent assistance.145 As the courts become more decon-
gested, the more business they have. 46 Next time around, let us
not be shrinking violets.
1 47
CONCLUSION
The law schools, the lawyers and the judges can remove the
unwelcome trademark of delay from litigation. The appellate
judges may furnish leadership. They are able to determine the
teaching of the schools by the content of bar examinations, the
standards of association, and the degree of control trial judges may
exercise.148 There are reserves of power in the law,1 49 and perhaps
only slight change may be a catalyst to a dissolution of conges-
tion. 1-0 The judicial councils of the circuits have specific power, if
they have sufficient funds and judges. 151 Appellate judges may dis-
cover, like Moses, that their function is not only to reveal the law
but also to lead us out of the desert. As Chief Justice Warren has
said: "We must not forget that the role of the courts is not merely
to define the right. It is also to administer the remedy. Unless the
remedy is actually applied to persons and things, the right is a mere
pious idea.'
152
Leaders, however, must have followers. We must support the
judges and have public support. Let us educate the citizenry in our
140 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1921).
141 Pound, Anachronisms in the Low, 3 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 142 (1920). Improving Judicial Ad-
ministration, A Glance Backward and a Look Ahead, 28 A.B.A.J. 804, 808 (1942).
142 " ... the movement has been to intrust broad powers to administrative commissions ...
which establish a customary law through the slow accretion of their own precedents: Such functions
should more properly lie with courts, who by training and experience ought to be better fitted for
their discharge.
" . . . [Tihe profession of the law has its fats in its own hands; it may continue to represent
a larger, more varied social will by a broader, more comprehensive interpretation. The change
must come from within; the profession must satisfy its community by becoming itself satisfied with
the community. . . The lawyer must either learn to live more capaciously or be content to find
himself continuously less trusted, more circumscribed, till he becomes hardly more important than
a minor administrator, confined to a monotonous round of record and routine, without dignity, in-
spiration, or respect." Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 617, 620-21 (1916).
143 Averbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions? 1959 Wis. L. Rev.
95, 108.
144 Id. at 106.
145 That this is inherently the power of the courts, see Nims, The Law's Delay; The Bar's Most
Urgent Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 27, 29 (1958).
146 "As we decongested our calendars we found we are getting more filings," Kaufman, J.,
Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 57.
147 Compare, Shepherd, Legal Controls Through Administrative Law, 14 Ore. L. Rev. 67, 77 (1934).
148 A trial court's control may depend upon the degree it is supported by appellate courts, Zeisel,
Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in the Court, 103 (1959).
149 "An appellate court rule which is part of a vigorous drive to clean up the court calendar may
have a better chance of changing a court's tradition than either statute or court decision," id. at 122.
Maricopa (Phoenix) County, Ariz., has had excellent results with minor changes in internal operation
and administration, Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 12; Institute of Judicial Ad., op, cit.
supra note 138, at 4-5.
15062 Stat. 902 (1948), 28 U.S.C. p. 331 (1948). Id. at 189-90. Cf. Cotter, Field Study of the
Operations of United States Courts, Report to Senate Appropriations Committee, pp. 79-84b, April,
1959.
151 Address before the American Law Institute as reported by the Attorney General in Proceed-
ings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 3.
152 Johnson, Does the Public Need a Code of Ethics, Too?, 13 A.B.A.J. 425, 426 (1927).
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ideals. 153  Tell how little the courts cost, 154 and the quantity and
quality of their effort, and break-throughs may be at hand without
our knowing it. Judge Clark sensed this when he said to the 1958
Conference that "the period becomes right for change, and suddenly
change occurs."'' At least, should we fail in our individual efforts,
the people growing tired of our muddling through, not such a heavy
hand will be laid on our democratic inheritance. 156  "Woe is unto
me," said Saint Paul, "if I preach not the gospel." 17
153 Half as much is spent on the judiciary as on the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Proceedings, op. cit.
supra note 106 at 51.
154 Snow, The Reform of Legal Administration: An Unauthorized Programme, 30 L.Q. Rev. 129, 130
(1892).
155 Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 118, at 128.
156 Gambrell, A High Challenge and a Proud Calling: The American Faith and the Federal Judi-
ciary, 42 A.B.A.J. 744, 745 (1956).
157 1 Corinthians 9:16, and see Sims, The Responsibility of the Bar for the Administration of
Justice, 16 A.B.A.J. 361, 362 (1930).
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CARRIER'S DUTY TO COLLECT FULL
APPLICABLE TARIFF RATE
By WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY*
Probably the most inflexibly applied duty known to current
law is the duty of a carrier to collect the full applicable tariff rate.
As a result some apparently surprising decisions, which would be
anachronisms to the common law, are commonly reached. How-
ever, analysis of the historical alternatives discloses that this in-
flexibility is generally necessary if discrimination between shippers
is to be avoided.
With respect to motor carriers, the statutory basis for the duty
to collect the full applicable tariff rate is found partially in section
316 of the Interstate Commerce Act,' which creates the duty not
only to establish and observe just and reasonable rates but also to
enforce such rates. More specifically, however, section 317 (b)
'2
states:
No common carrier by motor vehicle shall charge or de-
mand or collect or receive a greater or less or different com-
pensation for transportation or for any service in connec-
tion therewith between the points enumerated in such tariff
than the rates, fares, and charges specified in the tariffs in
effect at the time and no such carrier shall refund or remit
in any manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or
through any agent or broker or otherwise, any portion of
the rates, fares, or charges so specified, or extend to any
person any privileges or facilities for transportation in in-
terstate or foreign commerce except such as are specified in
its tariffs: Provided, That the provisions of sections 1 (7)
and 22 of this title shall apply to common carriers by motor
vehicles subject to this chapter.
A similar duty is imposed upon railroads3 and the decisions constru-
ing that section are applicable to motor carriers.
The original authoritative statement concerning the extent of
the duty of a common carrier to collect the applicable tariff is found
in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Fink4 in which the carrier had brought an action against a consignee
to recover the difference between the charge required by tariff, and
the amount originally paid by the consignee. The Court specifically
held that neither prior agreement with the carrier nor estoppel
would constitute a successful defense in an action based upon the
statutory requirement of equal rates. The extent of this statutory
duty is such that the carrier may successfully maintain an action
to collect the tariff rate even in cases where the carrier has know-
ingly quoted an illegally low rate, and the shipper has innocently
*Mr. Kenworthy was awarded the LL.B. degree cum laude from the University of Denver College of
Low in 1956. He is in the Colorado Springs offices of the firm Fugate, May, Mitchem and McGinley.
149 U.S.C. § 316 (1951).
249 U.S.C. I 317(b) (1951).
3 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1951).
4 250 U.S. 577 (1919).
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relied on the quotation to its detriment.5 In Peters-Quigan Corp. v.
Long Transp. Co.,6 the Interstate Commerce Commission stated:
There is no legal basis for charging rates on the article
other than that embraced in the classification description.
Under sec. 217 (b) of the Act, the defendants are prohibit-
ed from demanding, collecting or receiving compensation at
rates other than the rates contained in the tariffs on the
article actually shipped. Neither misunderstandings nor
agreements among shippers or receivers and carriers can
affect these statutory provisions which obligate the carriers
to collect, and the shippers or receivers to pay amounts no
different than the applicable rates.
In effect duly filed tariffs bind both the carrier and the shipper with
the force of law.7
In specific instances it has been held that a carrier is not barred
from collecting the full applicable rates even though it has uninten-
tionally and mistakenly failed to collect the proper amount," or has
made an honest mistake in classification after a thorough effort to
determine the applicable tariff.9 Similarly, no showing of hardship
upon the shipper will excuse payment of the full rate.' The effect
of these rules is summed up in the statement, "Equitable considera-
tions may not serve to justify failure of a carrier to collect, or re-
tention by a shipper of, any part of lawful tariff charges."
11
In actions brought by a carrier to recover the amount of under-
charges on a previous shipment, interest may be charged from the
date that the amount became due. This has been approached as a
matter of general common law which is a part of the federal right
to collect the full amount of the applicable tariff. 2 The claim for
undercharges has also been treated as one for a liquidated amount
such that interest may be recovered under the Colorado statutes.13
In view of the fact that the duty to collect the full tariff charge
is absolute and statutory, it necessarily follows that any settlement
or compromise of the shippers liability is void on its face. There-
fore, neither settlement nor accord and satisfaction will constitute
a valid defense to an action by the carrier to recover an under-
charge. 14 As a result litigation of even the smallest matters must be
pursued.' 5 For the same reasons it is not permissible for the shipper
to withhold from his payment sums allegedly due in compensation
for damage to the shipment. After payment of the tariff charges,
complaint may then be filed by the consignee for damages as a re-
sult of delay or other act of the shipper. 16
Another aspect of the rule requires strict compliance by the
shipper with all tariff rules and regulations as well as payment in
full. Thus in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Corneli Seed Co.1T it was
5 Hughes Transp., Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 212 (1954).
6 64 M.C.C. 581.
7 Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Corneli Seed Co., 161 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Idaho 1958).
8 Cent. Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.1, & P. Ry. Co., 20 F.2d 828 (1927).
9 Peters-Quigan Corp. v. Long Transp. Co., 64 M.C.C. 581.
10 Railway Express Agency v. Atlantic & Pac. Wire & Cable Co., 172 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1958).
11 Baldwin v. Scott Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939).
12 T. & M. Transp. Co. v. S.W. Shattuck Chem Co., 158 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1947).
13 Ibid.
14 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Lykes Bros., 294 Fed. 968 (D.C. Tex. 1923).
15 In United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. Colo. 1955) the anount in controversy was
$69.71.
16 Supra, note 10.
17 Supra, note 7.
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held that a processor receiving seeds for processing and then re-
shipping them to their final destination was not entitled to the
benefit of a transit or single factor rate upon ceasing to comply with
the regulations governing that tariff. The rule required the out-
bound bill of lading to show the point of origin of the shipment.
Even though former compliance with the rule had resulted in loss
of business to competitors, it was observed that the shipper must
comply with every pertinent provision of the tariff in order to se-
cure the lower rates established therein.
Only two exceptions are known to exist to the rule that a carrier
must collect the full amount of any undercharge which has oc-
curred. The first exception to the rule exists where a carrier has
transported goods under contract with the United States Govern-
ment. In such cases, only the contract price may be recovered; for
Section 22 of the act1 provides that, "Nothing in this chapter shall
prevent the carriage, storage, or handling of property free or at re-
duced rates for the United States." This exception applies, however,
only where the carriage was pursuant to an express agreement be-
tween the government and the carrier. Otherwise the applicable
tariff applies and it becomes the carrier's duty to collect the full
amount. Connecting carriers are apparently not bound by such con-
tracts in the absence of some concurrence on their part, privity of
contract, or at least conscious acquiescence. 19
The only defense which may be asserted by a private shipper
is the statute of limitations. The controlling statute in this respect
1849 U.S.C. § 22 (1951).
19 United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. Colo. 1955).
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is section 16 (3),20 which provides, "All actions at law by carriers
subject to this chapter for recovery of their charges, or any part
thereof, shall be begun within two years from the time the cause of
action accrues, and not thereafter." A state statute of limitations
cannot apply to actions by an interstate carrier for recovery of un-
dercharges.
21
With respect to intra-state shipments within Colorado, similar
results from those mentioned above are required.2 2 The statute ex-
pressly prohibits the carrier from receiving different compensation
from that filed in its schedule of tariffs. Both direct and indirect
evasions of the rule are banned.
A somewhat unique attempt to avoid the effect of this statute
was presented by a recent Colorado case.2 3 This was an action to
recover freight charges. Defendant was understandably disturbed
because the carrier's agent had misstated the rate, resulting in an
error of $482.04. Defendant had re-sold the goods carried in the be-
lief that the low rate mis-quoted to him established his costs. Con-
sequently a counter claim in tort was filed, based upon the alleged
negligence of the agent. The Colorado court held that the rule re-
quiring collection of the full applicable rate is not subject to evasion
on the basis of an alleged tort claim. It is of interest that the court
also emphasized the similarity between state and federal statutes
in this matter.
It was not always thus. One might have expected special con-
tracts to be prohibited by the provision in the Colorado Constitution
proscribing "undue or unreasonable discrimination" or "preference
in furnishing cars or motive power. '24 However, the legality of re-
bates was upheld in Bayles v. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.25 where a ship-
per brought suit to recover the balance of a rebate due under a spe-
cial contract with the defendant at lower than the published rates.
Judgement on demurrer for the defendant was reversed. It was held
that railway companies may discriminate so long as such discrimina-
tion is neither unjust nor unreasonable. In the absence of a showing
that such rates and privileges would not be extended to others simi-
larly situated the special contract was fully enforceable. In a sub-
sequent appeal of the same case 6 the court re-affirmed the stand
previously taken, pointing out that neither the common law nor the
Colorado Constitution prohibited contracts to transport persons or
freight at less than scheduled rates. In that opinion the court stat-
ed: "It is contended that unreasonable discrimination can best be
prevented by declaring all contracts for rebates void; but this rule
has the disadvantage of allowing a common carrier to profit by its
own iniquity."
Obviously it would be virtually impossible to prove that a car-
rier would not offer similar rates to other shippers similarly situat-
ed. Hence, the former rule offered no protection to the shipper
against discrimination. Cast in this background the rigidity of the
present rule that the carrier must collect the full applicable tariff
rate becomes excusable.
20 49 U.S.C. 1 16(3) (1951).
21 Strawberry Growers Selling Co. v. American Ry. Express Co.. 31 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1929).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-3-5 (1953).
23 Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Marty, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 615 (1960).
24 Colo. Const. art. XV, I 6. The provision applies only to railroads.
25 13 Colo. 181, 22 Pac. 341 (1889).
26 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bayles, 19 Colo. 348, 35 Pac. 744 (1894).
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THE EFFECT ON FUTURE INTERESTS OF A
WIDOW'S ELECTION AGAINST THE WILL
By JEROLD D. CUMMINSt
This note was awarded the first prize of $150 in the 1960 writing
competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Association
Trust Officers.
Colorado law provides that no person can devise or bequeath
away from his surviving spouse more than half of his estate with-
out invoking his spouse's right to take a statutory share of one-
half of the estate.1 This is an enlargement on the common law
dower and curtesy and undoubtedly creates a greater incentive for
renunciation of the will. The incentive is heightened when the will
creates for the surviving widow an estate for life or other interest
of restricted alienability and duration. Since a life estate is not
considered by the courts to be equivalent to a one-half interest in
the whole estate,2 there is going to be the problem of what effects
will follow if the widow should elect to take against the will.
Let us take two examples which have arisen in cases before the
Colorado Supreme Court. The first is pertinent to the problem even
though a surviving widow is not involved.
(1) The settlor created a living trust whereby he left a substan-
tial portion of his property to different members of his family. Part
of the income was to be paid to his son H for life and upon his
death to the son's wife L for her life on the condition that she and
her husband had not separated during the son's lifetime. After the
wife's death the income was to be paid per stirpes to the lawful issue
of H, but if there be no such issue living (or if living, extinction
should occur before the termination of the trust), then the income
was to be paid to A, B, and C. Before H died he and his wife were
divorced. H died leaving L and their children. L disclaimed any
interest in the life estate. The question was whether the income
should be paid to the children immediately or be held in suspense
until the death of L. The court held that even though the only
provision in the trust for paying the income to the children was
on L's death, the children's interest would be accelerated and the
income paid to them immediately. They declared that the prior
estate failed because of the disclaimer and because L did not survive
H as his widow. This is the only Colorado decision" recognizing
acceleration of future interests.
(2) Testator left one-half of his estate to his wife for life and
remainder to his brother and sister and the three children of a
former marriage. The residue of the estate he gave to A. The
widow elected to take a statutory one-half. It was apparently
assumed by all parties that the remainders were accelerated since
no issue was made of the matter. The question was whether A's
interest should be abated one-half to provide for the widow's forced
share. The court held that the abatement should effect all legacies
t Mr. Cummins is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 152-5-5 (1953).
2 E.g., Wolfe v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 Pac. 437 (1909).
3 Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945).
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proportionately and that A's interest would be reduced by fifty
percent.4  Query: Did this result in equal abatement? The testator
gave the remaindermen less than a half interest since their interests
were preceded by a life estate. Upon renunciation of the preceding
interest their interests were greatly magnified before they were
abated one-half. Other states, under such circumstances, have
ordered the life estate to be seized by a court-appointed trustee or
receiver and sequestered for the benefit of all disappointed legatees.)
Other cases in the Colorado reports appear to present similar oppor-
tunities for sequestration and yet the legatees never brought that
remedy to the court's attention." As will be shown later, not only
is sequestration recognized as a common law remedy in other juris-
dictions, but Colorado has always had a statute which undoubtedly
gives such relief.7 Its use has been confined to questions of contribu-
tion between legacies,8 and, as in the above case, it has been over-
looked as a means of providing more equitable relief for disap-
pointed legatees when a widow 9 renounces her life interest in favor
of a statutory share.
Acceleration and sequestration arise in situations other than
when a widow elects against a will, but this is by far the more
common situation. 0 This article will attempt to predict how the
Colorado courts will treat various types of future interests when
the testator's plans have been frustrated by his widow's renuncia-
tion of a carefully drawn will. The basic questions to be kept in
mind are (1) whether the interest is one which is traditionally
accelerated upon the disclaimer of the preceding life estate, and
(2) if it does appear to be of that type, do the circumstances warrant
the equitable relief of sequestration for the disappointed legatees?
ACCELERATION: THEORETICAL ASPECTS
Although it is true that the term "acceleration" is often used
by the courts when the life tenant dies before the testator, there
is no problem in this type of situation because the will itself pro-
vides that the "remainder" shall become possessory upon the death
of the life tenant. Actually there never was a remainder for the
4 Binkley v. Swiltzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920).
5 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878); Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Go. 181, 138 S.E. 60
(1927); Campbell v. Campbell, 380 III. 22, 42 N.E. 2d 547 (1942). Timberlake v. Parish's Ex'r, 35 Ky.
(5 Dana) 345 (1837); Adams v. Legroo, 111 Me. 302, 89 AtI. 63 (1913); Hinkley v. House of Refuge,
17 Am. Rep. 617, 40 Md. 461 (1874); Firth v. Denny, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 468 (1861); Sellick v. Sellick,
207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919); Cotton v. Fletcher, 81 N.H. 243, 123 AtI. 889 (1924); Holdren v.
Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N.E. 537 (1908); In re Lonegran's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 AtI. 387
(1931); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915); Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391, 22 AtI.
630 (1891); McReynolds v. Counts, 50 Va. (9 Grat.) 242 (1852). Contra, Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey
340 (D.C. 1888); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Sherman v. Baker,
20 R.I. 446, 40 Ati. 11 (1898).
6 Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99 (1887); Brinkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Par.
500 (1920); Peterson v. Stitzer, 103 Colo. 529, 87 P.2d 745 (1939).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-14-10 (1953), provides: "In all cases where a surviving spouse shall
renounce all benefits under the will and the legacies and bequests therein contained to other per-
sons shall in consequence thereof become increased or diminished io amount, quantity, or value, it
shall be the duty of the court upon the settlement of such estate to abate from or add to such
legacies and bequests in such manner as to equalize the loss sustained or advantage derived
thereby in a corresponding ratio to the several amounts of such legacies and bequests according to
the intrinsic value of each."
8 Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo. 471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934); Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500
(1920); Wolf v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 Par. 487 (1909); Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99
(1887).
9 The term "widow" will be used throughout this article. The statutes equally apply to a
widower.
10 For full treatment of acceleration and sequestration in all their aspects, see 2 Simes & Smith,
Future Interests, ch. 25 (2nd ed. 1956); Restatement, Property k§ 231-236 (1944); and the Appendix
to the Restatement of Property: "Aspects of the Law of Acceleration and Sequestration" written by
Professor Richard R. Powell, Reporter of the American Law Institute for the Restatement of Property.
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reason that what appears to be a remainder upon reading the will,
was never preceded by a freehold estate which took effect. Accel-
eration also occurred at common law in England and some Ameri-
can states when the life tenant forfeited his interest" (by treason,
felony, or tortious conveyance) or merged his estate with the next
succeeding vested interest.12 These two situations-forfeiture and
merger-have a different effect than other types of failure of the
life estate. The law has always regarded a merger or forfeiture to
occur after the life estate had been conveyed or devised. If the
remainder is a vested remainder, it will immediately become pos-
sessory since it was ready to take seisin "whenever and however
the preceding freehold estates determine."''I3 On the other hand, if
it was a contingent remainder in land the law at one time held that
it must fail and be destroyed forever.14 This was because the con-
tingent remainder could not become possessory until the condition
precedent had occurred. If it had not occurred'- and if there was
no other future interest to fill the gap in seisin, the land necessarily
reverted to the grantor or his successor in interest, and it would
require a new conveyance to take it away from him.
In contrast to this, when a life estate failed for any other reason,
such as disclaimer or renunciation, the harshness of the rule was
avoided by the fiction of "relation back" whereby the court looked
upon the renunciation as having occurred at the moment of the
testator's death.' 6 The effect is just the same as if the life tenant
had died before the testator. The will was construed as though the
life estate had never existed"7 and, thus, the remainder interest is
treated as a present interest. It has been held in Colorado that a
renunciation of a life estate does not take with it the remainder
which is limited thereon.'
11 Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng, Rep. 146 (1598).
12 Craig v. Warner, 5 Mackey 460 (D.C. 1887); Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249
(1931). These cases and Archer's Case, supro 11, involve reversionary interests which were accele-
rated to present possession.
13 This is the classic definition of a vested remainder. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities § 9
(4th ed. 1942).
14 Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 146 (1598).
15 If it had occurred, then it would no longer be a contingent remainder, but a vested remainder.
16 Of course, equitable contingent remainders were never subject to the rule of destructibility, so
there was never any reason for the fiction of "relation back" for them. Nevertheless the courts have
applied the fiction to them also. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 754 (D.C.D.C. 1950).
17 Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929);
Wallace v. Wallace, 118 Fla. 844, 160 So. 377 (1935); Rench v. Rench, 184 Iowa 1372, 169 N.W. 667
(1918); Citizens-Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Palumbo, 290 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1956); Wood's Adm'r v.
Wood's Devisees, 58 Ky. (1 Metc.) 512 (1859); Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, 118 Ati. 850 (1922);
Rose v. Rose, 126 Miss. 114, 88 So. 513 (1921); McCollum v. McCollum, 108 Neb. 82, 187 N.W. 783
(1922); Davidson v. Savings & Trust Co., 129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N.E. 845 (1935).
18 Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920).
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Although acceleration has been defined by one authority as a
"hastening of the owner of the future interest toward a status of
present possession,"'19 this is technically an inaccurate picture when
applied to cases of renunciation. Under the doctrine of "relation
back" the interest was a present interest the moment the testator
died. For all practical purposes, though, it is helpful to look at it
as it happened in reality, that is, there was a future interest until
the life estate was renounced. Therefore when it is said that a
vested remainder is accelerated, what is meant is that what would
have been a vested remainder, had not the life estate been dis-
claimed, is now a present interest. If the interest is what would
ordinarily be called a contingent remainder and the court does not
accelerate it for some reason, it is properly called an executory
interest.
2 0
The majority of decisions justify acceleration on the theory that
it best carries out the testator's intention, or at least his probable
intention.21 In this respect it resembles the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation which has developed in the law of wills. "If the
testator had known that the new will would be ineffective, would
he have intended to revoke the old one?" is not much different than
"if the testator had known the life estate would be ineffective would
he have intended to use the language he did?" The law of accelera-
tion involves so many varying circumstances, just as the circum-
stances surrounding the revocation of a will, that the answer de-
pends on how the court thinks the testator would change his will
if he were alive. The courts will go to great lengths to reconstruct
the probable intent of the testator. In one case acceleration was
allowed upon the widow's renunciation even though the will said
"It is my desire that no part of my real estate be disposed of until
after the death of my wife. '
22
Under this theory of probable intent, most vested remainders
will be accelerated and even many contingent remainders will be
accelerated. The usual case is one in which a life estate is given
to the wife "and upon her death the estate shall go to my children."
Although there is a technical condition precedent attached to the
vesting of the remainder-the death of the widow-the courts will
either interpret this to be a vested remainder and the words "upon
her death" as superfluous, 2' or they will look at it as a contingent
remainder with the implied condition precedent "upon her death
or other termination of the life estate. '24 Since the condition prece-
dent has been fulfilled, the remainder becomes a present estate.
Of course this is really the same thing as a vested remainder since
a condition precedent "whenever the prior estate terminates" ful-
fills the definition of a vested remainder. Even when the remainder
19 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 263 (2nd ed. 1956).
20 Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 In. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912). In Grossan v. Grossan, 303 Mo.
572, 580, 262 S.W. 701, 705 (1924) the court said: "It is suggested that the devise . . . was a
contingent remainder, and that the nullification of the particular estate destroyed the remainder.
That is true. It destroyed the remainder, as such. It did not destroy the devise to the daughters as
such."
21 See, e.g., Cotten v. Fletcher, 81 N.H. 243, 123 AtI. 889 (1924).
22 Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929).
23 Doe v. Considine, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 458 (1867); Minnig v. Batdorff, 5 Pa. 503 (1887); American
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 236 N.C. 594, 73 S.E.2d 468 (1952).
24 Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Vance's Estate, 141 Pa. 261, 21
AtI. 643 (1891). But cf. Lovell v. Town of Charlestown, 66 N.H. 584, 32 AtI. 160 (1891) where the
court refused to accelerate a vested remainder because "upon my wife's death" seemed to the court
to mean that the remainderman was rot to take until her death.
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is clearly contingent - e.g., to A for life and upon his death to B
if he then be living - the courts will often accelerate B's remainder
even though there is no assurance that he will survive A.2 5 Thus
the principle of acceleration is not merely an operation of law that
affects only vested remainders. Rather it is a way of reconstructing
the testator's will, the scheme of which has been upset by the
widow's election. In some .areas of the law, the distinction between
vested remainders and contingent remainders is important, but in
view of the fact that the courts accelerate remainders according to
the particular circumstances of each case the distinction is not
important. 26 Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis it is con-
venient to classify the situations into five groups.
REMAINDER VESTED INDEFEASIBLY
By the great weight of authority, vested remainders that are
not subject to divestment will be accelerated upon renunciation of
the life estate.2 1 When there are unusual circumstances the courts
have refused to accelerate a vested remainder. Thus where a re-
nounced life estate was an equitable interest under a trust and there
were other life estates concurrent with the renounced interest,
courts have refused to accelerate part of the remainders to fill in
the gap left by the renounced interest. To work an acceleration,




When the future interest is subject to a condition precedent
the courts have encountered some difficulty in establishing a set
rule as to what kind shall be accelerated and what kind shall not.
The Restatement takes the view that no acceleration should take
place "so long as a condition precedent to such succeeding interest
continues unfulfilled."- 9 However, it recognizes that as a rule of
construction, language which would ordinarily be construed as
creating a condition precedent should be reconstrued in light of
the renunciation.3 1 With this in mind a court may come to the
conclusion that the testator's intention would best be aided by
accelerating the interest. Thus a description of the persons to take
after the life estate as the "surviving children" or "those children
as are living upon my wife's death" has often been interpreted by
the courts to refer to those that will survive the termination of
the life estate no matter how it ends and not necessarily the ter-
mination of the widow's life. In Scotten v. Moore 3 ' the testator
gave all his estate to his wife for life and after her death to "my
25 Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950); Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 III.
606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Citizens-Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Palumbo, 290 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1956).
26 Scotten v. Moore, 28 Del. 545, 93 AtI. 373 (1914); Nelson v. Meade, 129 Me. 61, 149 Ati. 626
(1930); American National Bank v. Chaplin, 130 Va. 1, 107 S.E. 636 (1921). Contra, Sueske v. Scho-
field, 376 III. 431, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941); Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1925).
27 Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950) (one remainder was vested, the other
contingent. Both were accelerated.); Bank of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Ga. 181, 138 S.E. 60 (1927);
Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875); Adams v. Legroo, Ill Me. 302, 89 AtI. 63 (1913); Sherman v.
Baker, 20 R.I. 446, 40 AtI. 11 (1898); In re Borchert's Will, 259 Wis. 361, 48 N.W.2d 496 (1951).
28Toombs v. Spratlin, 127 Go. 766, 97 Atl. 1044 (1907); Windsor v. Bornet, 201 Iowa 1226, 207
N.W. 362 (1926); United States Trust Co. of New York v. Douglass, 143 Me. 150, 56 A.2d 633 (1948);
Plympton v. Plympton, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 178 (18631; Roe's Executors v. Roe, 21 N.J. Eq. 253 (1871);
In re Reighard's Estate, 253 Pa. 43, 97 Ati. 1044 (1916). But cf. Loew's Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 139 Atl.
582 (1927). Where the remaindermen ore also the holders of the concurrent life estates, no harm will
result upon acceleration. Randall v. Randall, 85 Md. 430, 37 AtI. 209 (1897); Wyllner's Estate, 65 Pa.
Super. Ct. 396 (1917).
29 Restatement, Property 1 233 (1944).
30 Id. comment c.
31 28 Del. 545, 93 Ati. 373 (1914).
DICTA
DICTA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
then living children (or in case of their death to their legal repre-
sentatives) share and share alike." The court held that the principle
of acceleration is based on the presumed intention of the testator,
and that there need be no distinction made between vested and
contingent remainders. The court reasoned that when it appears
that possession by the remainderman is postponed solely for the
benefit of the widow, it is presumably the intention of the testator
that her renunciation is equivalent to her death.
32
When the condition precedent is of a nature that something
more than the mere termination of the life estate is required, there
will be no acceleration. Thus when T gave property to his wife for
life and the remainder to his daughters, provided they shall tenderly
care for the widow for the rest of her life, there was no acceleration
upon the widow's renunciation since the testator intended the post-
ponement of the remainders to depend on their taking care of his
wife.3 3
REMIAINDERS VESTED SUBJECT TO COMPLETE DEFEASANCE
Most of the cases of this classification are construed in the same
way that contingent remainders are construed. There is not much
difference between "to A for life and then to B if living; if not
living then to C" and "to A for life and then to B; but if B does not
survive A, then to C." In the first example the remainder to B is
contingent; in the second example the remainder is vested subject
to complete defeasance. It would seem that a remainder of this
type should be accelerated since it is highly probable that the
testator made alternative dispositions which were dependent on
B's being alive at the termination of the life estate so he could
personally be benefited. Since the life estate has been removed, B
should be able to take possession. There is substantial authority
that such a limitation should be accelerated and become indefeas-
ible .3 4 Some courts have taken a middle road and have accelerated
the remainders but subjected them to divestment should the re-
mainderman not survive the life tenant.3 5 Colorado apparently
32 See also Mayhew v. Atkinson, 93 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.D.C. 1950) (step children who may be
living); Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308 (1878) (gift to wife and daughter iointly for life, survivor to take
the whole. On death of both, remainder to heirs of the daughter. Held, daughter took whole of life
estate even though not yet the "survivor."); Equitable irust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d
422 (1943); Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941) (nieces and nephews then living);
O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S.W. 1107 (1914) (to descendants of life tenant as in intestacy);
Eastern Trust & Banking Co. v. Edmunds, 133 Me. 450, 179 Aft. 716 (1935) (grandson if living).
Contra, Sueska v. Schofield, 276 III. 43, 34 N.E.2d 399 (1941) (upon death of widow to her descen-
dants if any); Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 III. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1925) (brothers and sisters of testator
if they be living at death of wife); Cassidy v. Padgett, 99 Ind. App. 239 (1934); Stevens' Ex'r v.
Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N.E. 570 (1929) (to A and B should they be living at widow's death).
33 Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S.W. 701 (1924). See also Wood's Adm'r v. Wood's
Devisees, 58 Ky. (I Metc.) 512 (1859) (at death of widow to J. provided he be living and has arrived
at the age of twenty-five); Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885) (at expira-
tion of three years from the death of wife to be distributed in equal shares to A and B); Key's
Estate, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 216 (1895) (remainder to "heirs" of life tenant).
34 Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey 340 (D.C. 1888); Decker v. Decker, 251 Ala. 278, 37 S0.2d 204
(1948); Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Rench v. Rench, 184 Iowa 1372,
169 N.W. 667 (1918); Keen v. Brooks, 186 Md. 543, 47 A.2d 67 (1946); Young v. Eagon, 131 N.J.Eq.
574, 26 A.2d 180 (1942); Petition of Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 198 Misc. 536, 99 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1950); American Trust Co. v. Johnson, 236 N.C. 594, 73 S.E.2d 468 (1952) (court calls the remainder a
vested interest subject to divestment, but it appears to be alternative contingent remainders); In re
Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 AtI. 804 (1917); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d
415 (1951). See also Restatement, Property § 231, comment h (1944). Contra, In re Roger's Estate, 97
Md. 674, 55 AtI. 679 (1903); Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N.E. 942 (1894); In re Atkinson's
Will, 81 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Surr. 1949).
35 Hasomeier v. Welke, 309 III. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923); Parker v. Ross, 69 N.H. 213, 45 AtI.
-576 (1897).
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followed this rule in a case where the interests were equitable and
the trust was to continue.
3 6
CLASS GIFTS
The cases involving remainders to a class are very similar to
situations where the remainder is vested subject to complete de-
feasance. The only added question is, when does the class close if
the remainder is accelerated? It should be kept in mind that some
class gifts are contingent remainders (e.g., to A for life, and then
to his surviving children) and there may be the added problem of
construing words of condition precedent. Some courts have held
that merely because the remainder is accelerated does not require
the class to close before the death of the life tenant.3 7 But there are
problems in this solution unless the gift is land, since the trustee
or personal representative must retain enough of the corpus in case
the class should increase in size. Consequently, as a matter of con-
venience, the majority of the courts have held that acceleration
should be accompanied with the closing of the class.3 The question
has not been decided in Colorado.3 9 The Restatement is in accord
with the majority view but recognizes that manifestation of a
contrary intent will keep the class open.40  Also, of course, mani-
festation of a contrary intention may keep the remainder from
being accelerated in the first place.
EXECUTORY INTERESTS
As we have seen in the section on vested remainders subject to
complete defeasance, when an executory interest is limited upon
a vested remainder, there is the probability that acceleration of the-
remainder will destroy the executory interest. 4' A good example
of this is found in Albright v. Albright .4 2 In that case the testator
left his wife most of his estate. Some of the property, however,
was given in the form of a life estate to his wife with remainder
36 Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472 (1945). See note 3 supro, and
the accompanying text. Afte the remainder was accelerated the trust continued. Althouugh the court
did not expressly so hold, it was implied in their decision that the interests were still subject to
divestment.
37 Askey v. Askey, 141 Neb. 406, 196 N.W. 891 (1923); Yeoton v. Roberts, 28 N.H. 459 (1854)-
Neill v. Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 57 S.E.2d 385 (1949).
38 Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941); Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875);
Sherman v. Baker, 20 R.I. 446, 40 AtI. 11 (1898); American Nat. Bank v. Chapin, 130 Va. 1, 107
S.E. 636 (1921).
39 In Brunton v. International Trust Co., supra note 36, the remainder was to the issue,
(per stirpes) of the settlor's son. Upon renunciation of the preceding life estate the remainder
accelerated. The class closed of necessity since the settlor's son was dead. The class would hove
closed even if there were no acceleration.
40 Restatement, Property § 231 comment i (1944).
41 See cases collected in note 34, supro.
42 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951).
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to two daughters, but if either die before their mother then their
children were to take in their place. In order to free the property
of these restrictions the widow disclaimed her life estate and agreed
with her daughters to a settlement by which they would divide
the property so that each would get a fee simple in her share. The
widow did not take her statutory share. The court held that the
disclaimer accelerated the remainders to possessory status. The
gifts over to the grandchildren were destroyed since the court
thought that the testator would not want to divest his daughters
of their interests once they had become possessory. Professor Simes
suggests that where an executory interest is of the type that divests
only a possessory interest, there should not be acceleration.43 Thus
where land is devised to A in fee simple, but if A die without issue,
then to B in fee simple absolute, B's interest should not be acceler-
ated upon A's renunciation, but would be converted from a shifting
executory interest into a springing executory interest.
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
As will be discussed in the next section, even though there
would be ample reason to accelerate a future interest, a court may
choose to halt the acceleration and sequester the life estate on the
theory that the testator's plan would be better accomplished by
compensating those legatees who lose more than others by the
widow taking her statutory share. This exception to acceleration
applies to all types of future interests.
All the foregoing discussion has been on the assumption that the
proper theory of acceleration is that it is based on a reconstruction
of the will; that courts should not follow historically-fixed rules of
property if they can discern a contrary intention in the spirit of the
will, even though a strict interpretation of the written language
would not suggest it. They also justify their decisions on the ground
that the testator is presumed to know of his wife's right to a statu-
tory share (or dower as the case may be) and therefore must have
contemplated the possibility that the remainders would be accel-
erated. There are a few decisions that take the more realistic view
that the testator's intentions have been frustrated and the court is
merely trying to patch up remnants of the will rather than have
the testator's desires be completely frustrated by having the whole
estate pass by intestacy.
4
There is a third theory that a few courts seem to go on. It is
based on a strict common law principle that wills must be construed
literally and should not be "reconstrued" in light of subsequent
frustration. This view favors the explicit meaning of words over
judicial mind-reading. Under this theory vested remainders are
automatically accelerated where there is no preceding freehold that
ever came into existence. Contingent remainders become springing
executory interests since to accelerate them would pass over the
condition precedent as required by the language of the will.4.5 This
43 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 289 (2nd ed. 1956).
44 Woodburn's Estate, 151 Pa.St. 586, 25 At. 145 (1892); In re Mcllhattan's Will, 194 Wis. 113,
216 N.W. 130 (1927). In rare circumstances the courts will declare the whole will invalid because of
the devastating effect of the widow's election. Fennell v. Fennell, 80 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1038 (1909);
In re Estate of Hunter, 129 Neb. 529, 262 N.W. 41 (1935).
45 Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N.E. 942 (1894) in which the testator left his estate in
trust for his wife for life and at her death to be Paid to her daughter, but if the daughter be not
living at her death, then to the issue of such daughter. The court, in an opinion by Holmes, J., held
that the words "at her death" prevented acceleration. See also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 205 Ill. App.
15 (1917); Stevens v. Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N.E. 570 (1929); Compton v. Rixey's Executor,
124 Va. 548, 98 S.E. 651 (1919).
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view tends to penalize testators who fail to provide alternative
dispositions in case their wives elect against the will (assuming
they would have wished acceleration to take place).
SEQUESTRATION
Since every time there is an acceleration of a future interest
there is a corresponding increase in its value, it usually occurs that
some other legatee or devisee loses a larger part of his gift than he
would otherwise. In most states this occurs most often to a resid-
uary legatee since the personal representatives will take his share
to pay all claims before other gifts are abated. 46 This rule of abate-
ment is changed in Colorado because of section 152-14-10 of the
1953 Colorado Revised Statutes.4 7 This statute has been interpreted
to mean proportionate abatement regardless of whether the differ-
ent legacies are specific, general, or residual . 4 The words "legacies
and bequests" should be taken to include devises of real property."
The statute is of little effect, however, if after the proper abatement,
a remainder is increased in value by its acceleration, thus decreas-
ing the percentage of its share of the abatement. This would be
proper if the testator intended such a result, but many testators
would probably have meant for the other legatees to receive more
than they would get if acceleration is allowed. There are situations,
of course, where acceleration would not deprive anyone of his just
proportion. Thus where the entire estate is given to the wife for life
with the remainder over, acceleration will not distort the testatmen-
tary scheme no matter how many persons have an interest in the
remainder. Also when the remaindermen are the beneficiaries of all
the other gifts other than the wife's, there will be no distortion.
Where substantial distortion can occur is given by the follow-
ing hypothetical situation: Testator having an estate worth $100,000
leaves $50,000 to his child A by a former marriage and the residue
he leaves to his present wife for life with the remainder to her
daughter B, the testator's stepchild. The wife's life estate is present-
46 See, e.g., Pace v. Pace, 271 III. 114, 110 N.E. 878 (1915).
47 Supra note 7.
48 This interpretation has often been repeated, but always is dictum. See Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo.
471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934) where all gifts were specific legacies, but the language used by the court was
broader; Binkley v. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176, 192 Pac. 500 (1920) where all gifts abated pro rata, but
all were of same class; Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 Pac. 99 (1887) where gifts were of same class,
but the court said: " . .. all legacies and bequests (which words include devises of real estate)
are to be equalized under the statutory provisions." at 50, 192 Pac. at 102.
49 Logan v. Logan, supra note 47.
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ly worth, let us say, $20,000 and the remainder, $30,000. If the wife
renounces and takes her $50,000 statutory share, then both the pe-
cuniary gift to A and the remainder to B will abate one-half. A is
entitled to $25,000 at this point and B will get $15,000. There is still
the life estate to be disposed of. If the remainder is accelerated then
B will receive $25,000 which represents a net reduction of only
16 2/3%. The other child's gift remains at a reduction of 50%. If in-
stead of acceleration, the widow's life estate is sequestered for the
benefit of disappointed legatees (in this case both A and B, since in
Colorado all legacies are abated equally) the estate would be more
equitably distributed. The doctrine of sequestration is widely rec-
ognized in this type of situation.51t The courts will appoint a trustee
to receive the income from the life estate and pay it to the legatees
in proportion to their interests. Thus, in this case, A would get five-
eighths of the income and B would get three-eighths. When the
widow dies, her daughter or her daughter's successor in interest will
receive the property in fee simple absolute.
The same result should follow if B's interest was a contingent
remainder that would not normally accelerate, for instance "to my
wife for life and then to my daughter on the condition that they take
care of my wife for the rest of her natural life." Since there would
be no aceleration, the renounced life estate should be sequestered in
the same manner. In this case sequestration is not used to alleviate
distortion between legacies, but simply to compensate disappointed
legatees. Otherwise the life estate would pass into the residuary
fund or go by intestacy.
It would seem from the language of section 152-14-10 that the
common law doctrine of sequestration should be used whenever a
widow's election deprives a beneficiary of part or all of his gift if it
can be made up to him by using the renounced interest. If the wid-
ow renounced a legacy of property in fee simple, the other legatees
would share in the property to compensate for the reduction in the
whole estate. The same result should follow if what is renounced is
a life estate. The statute expressly orders the court to equalize the
losses (and not merely abate) acording to the value of the legacies.
A few courts have invented an alternative remedy that reaches
the same result that sequestration does. In Tomb v. Bardol the
court accelerated the remainder and placed a charge on the real
property to compensate disappointed legatees. It should be noted
that this proceeds on a different theory than where a court, after
paying the widow her share, distributes the residuary property with
a charge placed on it in favor of other legatees or claimants. That is
but a method of distributing the estate, the courts going to great
lengths to find language in the will implying such a charge, and us-
ually (at least in states other than Colorado) the residuary legatee
has to bear the burden of paying off the claims including the wid-
ow's share. Since section 152-14-10 changed the common law as to
abatement, the principle used in Tomb v. Bardo would be applicable
as well as sequestration.
50 See cases collected in note 5 supro.
51 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941). Simes states that this is the only case where this remedy
has been used. 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests at 297 (2nd ed. 1956). He overlooks the early
cases of Allen v. Hannum, 15 Kan. 625 (1875); Sarles v. Sarles, 19 Abb. N.Cas. 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1887); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915).
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The Restatement originally favored only sequestration, but
after the above case was decided it was amended to read: "Whether
sequestration or charge is used for the minimizing of distortion de-
pends upon the judicial choice as to which remedy is more effi-
cient. ' '52 Although sequestration is the more common relief given,
it is submitted that it has several weaknesses. (1) The costs of hav-
ing a court-appointed trustee or receiver to manage the life estate
is high, thus limiting the use to cases where there is great distortion
between legacies. (2) Litigation might arise should the widow out-
live her expected lifespan, since that would mean that the remand-
erman's interest was overvaluated and the other disappointed lega-
tees would demand that they should have a greater proportion of the
distributed income. (3) It is possible that the widow might live so
long that the income from her life estate would fully compensate the
abated legacies. The question would then arise as to who should get
this income. These problems are eliminated if Tomb v. Bardo is
followed and the remainders are accelerated subject to an equitable
charge. Thus: testator devises Blackacre (worth $100,000) to his
wife for life and remainder to his daughter A, and the residue of his
property (worth $30,000) to son B. If the wife elects to take her
statutory one-half, the two gifts abate proportionately and she
would get one-half to Blackacre and $15,000. The remainder in the
other half of Blackacre is accelerated and charged with an amount
to satisfy the disappointed legatees. At this point it is important to
recognize that both A and B are disappointed legatees. Thus the
charge on Blackacre should be just enough to give B a proper share
of the increased value given to the remainder by acceleration. This
increased value must be calculated according to the widow's life ex-
pectancy, i.e., what the life estate would be worth had she not re-
nounced it. If this were calculated to be worth $30,000 then the re-
mainder would be worth about $70,000. Out of every dollar increase
due to acceleration, 30% should go to B and 70% to A, because such
is the ratio of the intrinsic value '13 of the orginal gifts, i.e., a $70,000
remainder to A and a legacy of $30,000 to B. A charge of $9000 (30%
of the value of the life estate) should be placed on A's half of Black-
acre to be paid to B. This device avoids the expense of having the
court administer the life estate and settles the question of the ratio
52 Restatement Property f 234, comment aa (1949 amendment to 1944 ed.).
53 ". . it shall be the duty of the court . . . to abate from or add to such legacies . . . to
equalize the loss sustained . . . in a corresponding ratio to the several amounts of such legacies
and bequests according to the intrinsic value of each." Colo. Rev. Stat. 152-14-10 (1953).
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORES
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies, Paints,
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Main Store-2606-16 E. Colfax FR. 7-2764
Open Evenings Until 8:00 P.M., Sundays 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
Marsolek's TV Service Center-3539 E. Colfax DE. 3-1595
Lawn Mowers Sharpened
Bring your Radio and TV to us for repair-90-Day Guarantee
- Open 8:30 to 6:30 Mon. to Sat. -
DICTA
DICTA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
of distribution once and for all by the use of mortality tables in es-
timating the value of the life estate.
Although there is no Colorado decision on the subject of seques-
tration, there is persuasive authority in favor of such relief by vir-
tue of the fact that section 152-14-10 was taken54 directly from an
Illinois statute that has been construed several times by the courts
of that state. (These Illinois decisions were written after the Colo-
rado statute was enacted, but the Colorado Supreme Court has
strongly relied on subsequent decisions of Illinois courts in constru-
ing this same statute in relation to another question.)5 5 The Illinois
courts have interpreted the statute to require sequestration of a re-
nounced life estate for the benefit of disappointed legatees. In Wake-
field v. Wakefield" the testator bequeathed pecuniary gifts to a
number of individuals. He gave his wife a life estate in all the rest
of his property and provided that at the death of the wife, $2000 was
to be paid to A if he was then living. All the rest went to the chil-
dren of B and the children of C in equal shares. The widow elected
to take her statutory share. The court held that the statute required
the life estate to be sequestered to equalize the disappointed lega-
tees. Since the remainder was contingent there might not have been
an acceleration even in the absence of sequestration, but in Conant
v. Elgin City Banking Co. 5 T the court expressly held that a vested
remainder would not be accelerated if sequestration was required
to equalize the losses. In other cases the Illinois courts have held
that where the remainder is subject to a condition precedent other
than the termination of the life estate, sequestration is in order.
Iowa is the only other state which has a statute controlling
abatement on a widow's renunciation. 59 Although the Iowa statute
is not identical in wording to the Colorado and Illinois statutes, it
provides that the amount of any claim that must be satisfied in op-
position to or in disregard of the provisions of the will must be
taken ratably from the interests of the heirs, devisees, and legatees.
This has been construed to provide for sequestration of a life estate
when a widow elects against the will. The leading case is Bening v.
Eischeid60 in which the testator left his estate in trust with income
up to $600 per year to be paid to his wife for life; any additional in-
come to be paid to A and B. Upon the widow's death the trust was
to terminate and the property to pass in the following ratio: one-
third to C and two-thirds to A and B. The widow renounced her life
54 Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P.c. 99 (1887).
55 Id. at 49, 17 Pac. at 101. The question was whether the entire will was destroyed by the
renunciation of the widow. The court said: "Were this a new question, as counsel suggests, we
would not only deem the foregoing interpretation duly authorized by the reasons and considerations
given, but consider it the duty of the court to accept it as the more reasonable construction. It is,
however, not a new question . . . . Since the appropriation of that section by our legislature . . .
the supreme court of Illinois has decided that a will is not destroyed . . . by the renunciation of the
widow, but that all legacies and bequests (which words are construed to include devises of real
estate) are to be equalized under this statutory provision. Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 III. 144." The
identical Illinois statute was Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, ch. 3, § 78. In 1939 the wording of the statute
was changed but the Illinois court held that it did not alter the effect whatsoever. In re Reighard's
Estate, 402 Ill. 364, 84 N.E. 2d 345 (1949). The present Illinois act can be found in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1959, ch. 3, 9 202.
56 256 III. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912).
57 232 III. App. 156 (1924). See also Pillsbury v. Early, 252 III. App. 620 (1929).
58 Campbell v. Campbell, 380 III. 22, 42 N.E.2d 547 (1942); Sueske v. Schofield, 376 III. 431, 34
N.E.2d 399 (1941); Foreman Trust & Savings Bank v. Seelenfreund, 329 Ill. 546, 161 N.E. 88 (1928);
Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 31, 150 N.E. 333 (1926); Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 III. 11 (1880).
All these decisions based their result on the Illinois statute which is identical to the Colorado statute.
59 Section 633.14, Code of Iowa, 1954.
60240 Iowa 1294, 39 N.W.2d 299 (1949). Cf. McGuire v. Luckey, 129 Iowa 559, 105 N.W. 1004
(1946); Shedenhelm v. Cafferty, 174 Iowa 195, 256 N.W. 340 (1916).
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estate and took a statutory third of the whole estate. The trust fund
was reduced from $71,500 to $46,000. The drop in income to be paid
A and B was 33 1/3%. But if they were allowed to receive the $600
yearly income that the widow relinguished (by the terms of the
trust they were to take all residue income, and at the same time
they owned part of the remainder interest which conceivably might
be accelerated) the net drop would only be 18%. The court held
that the $600 income could be sequestered and distributed to equal-
ize the losses suffered because of the widow's taking one-third of
the estate.61
It would seem that under the authority of these cases and the
unambiguous language of section 152-14-10, Colorado would prob-
ably apply the sequestration doctrine whenever disappointed lega-
tees were astute enough to apply to the courts for that relief. Even
when there is no distortion between legacies, as where no accelera-
tion occurs, the life estate should be sequested to compensate all
legatees for the depletion of their gifts.
61 Sequestration was in order, but the court, rather than appoint a trustee, changed the value of
the remainder interest in favor of C and awarded the income of the trust to A and B. The parties
had already stipulated as to the value of the life estate in the widow by utilizing the mortality
tables. This method of handling the distribution is similar to the method used in Tomb v. Bardo,
supra at note 50.
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ADVICE FOR ADVISORS - TRUST INVESTMENTS
By YALE HUFFMANf
This note was awarded the second prize of $100 in the 1960 writ-
ing competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Associa-
tion Trust Officers.
I. THE PROBLEM
Too often the corporate trustee is compelled to make an invest-
ment decision which his common sense opposes. Trust officers,
mindful of their liabilities should even the slightest risk materialize,
sometimes must take the sure-safe course against their inner judg-
ment. The "prudent man" rule, as it is stringently applied to trus-
tees, threatens to make timid souls of good red-blooded American
fiduciaries.
Two examples will illustrate the problem. In the first, a trust
estate includes common stock in a young growth company. Divi-
dends have produced a consistent 7% return. A good profit poten-
tial is enhanced by the prospect of a stock-split, likely in the offing.
Chances of a drop in the market appear remote; the trust officer's
personal hunch is that the odds are 50 to 1 that the stock will seek
a higher level. But he sells the attractive stock and re-invests the
proceeds at half the former return - to the distress of the bene-
ficiary.
A second example is offered by a trust estate which includes
a controlling block of shares in a close family corporation. Death
of the settlor has cast a tiny cloud over the future of the venture;
a cloud which would probably be dispelled were control to remain
in the trust estate. The widow beneficiary and her good friends in
the company importune the trustee to retain the shares - but he
disposes of them and buys ultra-conservative securities.'
Does the law require trustees to be so timorous? A first glance
at Colorado's statute2 dealing with the investment responsibilities
of trustees would appear to offer encouragement to the trustee who
would deal squarely with the risks involved in special situations.
Fiduciaries are expressly authorized:
to acquire and retain every kind of property - real, personal
and mixed - and every kind of investment, specifically includ-
ing, but not by way of limitation, . . .stocks, preferred or com-
mon . . . which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
would acquire or retain on their own account.2
Commenting soon after the passage of this statute in 1951, Dean
Edward C. King said, "Properly understood, it will facilitate the in-
vestment of trust funds, will tend to produce a better income for
beneficiaries, and will permit wider diversification of investments.4
Are trustees, then, to be blamed for pusillanimity which trou-
Mr. Huffman is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 83-1-1 (1953) gives statutory approval to certain archcons-rvtive securities
bringing law returns. It is mandatory for certain public funds, and sometimes has been used by
Private trustees as on investment guide.
2 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 57-3-1 to 6 (1953).
.3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 57-3-1 (1953).
4 King, The Meaning of the "Prudent Man Rule," 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 44 (1951).
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
bles their beneficiaries? Not if one reads the rules of prudence
which preface the statutory language quoted above. Trustees must:
. . . have in mind the size, nature and needs of the estates en-
trusted to their care, and shall exercise the judgment and care
under the circumstances then prevailing which men of pru-
dence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management
of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds. .... 5
A trustee must be doubly prudent. Not only must he adhere to
the standards prescribed; he must also consider the hindsight which
might occur some day in court. True, some court decisions disclaim
Fed. Reserve Reg. F, 12 C.F.R. § 206 (1959).
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any tendency to use hindsight, and the statute speaks of "circum-
stances then prevailing ' 6 - but a judge has wide fields of specula-
tion to range when he is deciding what a prudent, discreet, intelli-
gent man should have done months before. An investment which
looked good to the trustee last year may not look prudent to the
court today, or to the supreme court tomorrow. Poor widow plain-
tiffs have winning ways against banker-trustee defendants.
The trust officer of a national bank is mindful, too, of federal
regulations 7 making his board of directors responsible for invest-
ment decisions, as steered by the trust investment committee.
A corporate trustee which fails to sell stocks is likely to be held
to its "duty to exercise a proper degree of care and skill"8 - leading
in turn to questions of proper internal organization of the trust
company, or the proper functioning of its officers.9 A trust officer,
confronted with the prospect of judicial scrutiny of the inner work-
ings of his department, may well conclude that the "discretion"
vested in him is, as a practical matter, very narrow indeed.
Nor can he turn elsewhere for guidance. It is only the extra-
ordinary situation which will lead a court to make a trustee's deci-
sions for him."' He might consult with experts, but must not allow
their advice to govern him - as Mayor Curley discovered in Bos-
ton.11 Mayor Curley's problem arose from a trust created by Ben-
jamin Franklin, manifestly for the purpose of demonstrating the
validity of his maxim, "A penny saved is a penny earned." Franklin
settled on the people of Boston a thousand pounds sterling to be
placed at interest for a hundred years, forseeing a corpus of 139,000
pounds at the end of the century. At that point the trustees were
to spend 100,000 pounds and place the rest at interest for another
century - ad infinitum. It was this re-investment which the mayor
-trustee sought to delegate to the city treasurer. The court forbade
it: "The trustee cannot properly employ an agent to select invest-
ments."
Short of such reliance, and proper, is for the trustee to listen to
advice and reserve to himself the final decision.12 However, he has
little freedom to buy advice.13 Authority differs whether such an
expense is proper when not expressly authorized by the trust in-
strument. A trustee may encounter a variety of answers to the
question, "Is investment counsel expense proper?"
14
Summarizing the problem at hand, it seems accurate to say that
any departure by the trustee from the norms of orthodoxy in the
investment field may produce litigation which he has a strong
chance of losing -unless the terms of the instrument afford a way
out.
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 57.3-1 (1953).
7 Ibid.
8 77 A.L.R. 505 (1931).
9 2 Scott, Trusts f 174.1 (2nd ed. 1956).
10 Id. 1 259.
11 City of Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931).
12 In re Dodge, 39 N.Y.$.2d 186 (1943).
13 2 Scott, Trusts 1 188.3 (2d ed. 1956).
14 The variety of answers encountered: In re Gutman, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (1937) (no); In re




Trust draftsmen have contrived at least four escape-mecnan-
isms from some of the consequences described above. Three of them
are of limited efficiency: the co-trustee, the discretionary clause,
and 'che exculpatory clause.
The first of these, the co-trustee, is often one who has been
brought in because he is peculiarly equipped to make the invest-
ment decisions arising out of trusts. This does not solve the whole
problem, however, because his special qualifications do not free his
co-trustees from liability for improvident investments. One trustee.
may not delegate any discretionary duties to another trustee. "It is
improper for one of the trustees to leave to the others the control
over the administration of a trust," says Scott.15 Hence the corpo-
rate trustee gets little surcease from the presence of a co-trustee ad-
visor; he still must exercise his independent judgment in invest-
ment matters and may be liable for unintelligent decisions.
Nor does the advisor welcome a full co-trusteeship. The reason
for bringing him in may be solely for the purpose of reviewing in-
vestment decisions. To clothe him with the garb of trustee is to
burden him with duties and liabilities not commensurate with the
specific job intended for him.
The objections just stated are voiced on behalf of the corporate
trustee and the advisor individually. Further objection may be
raised by them together; that the placement of all discretionary
15 2 Scott, Trusts 1 184 (2d ed. 1956).
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duties with them jointly produces duplication of effort, and that be-
fore either can move he must await the other. A deadlock takes
them both to court.
The harness of co-trusteeship, although desirable in many rn-
stances, may prove too cumbersome for the team whose work we
are discussing here.
A second device, the discretionary clause, may do little more
than duplicate the effects of the prudent man rule established by
the decisions16 and re-affirmed by statutes like Colorado's. "The
courts are likely to interpret such provisions rather strictly," cau-
tions Scott.17 Even if the instrument contains an express direction
to retain certain stocks, the trustee may be held liable for impru-
dent compliance with the directions.' 8 A clause may provide that
the trustee can recruit investment counsel, and pay for it, but it
does not relieve him of the ultimate decision and the liability which
follows.
The third mechanism, the exculpatory clause, is of questionable
value in dealing with the problem under study here. It is proper to
relieve a trustee of the consequences of ordinary negligence; but if
such a clause goes too far in exempting the trustee from any lia-
bility whatever for the consequences of his mistakes, it may have
defeated the very purpose of having a trust at all. A trust is de-
signed to lodge somewhere the responsibility of managing the
estate. Responsibility without some liability is an anamoly. Public
policy cannot support carte blanche waivers of trustees' liabilities.19
On the other hand, too faint an exculpation may afford the trustee
no reassurance that he is protected, and he finds himself at the door
wherein we entered at the beginning of this article.
Some of the cures mentioned up to this point may be compared
with the old mustard-plaster treatment of the common cold: the
cure was worse than the ailment. But a specific remedy remains to
be examined.
The fourth contrivance appears to be the most versatile and ef-
fective solution for special investment problems. It is suggested in
2 Scott § 185: "By the terms of the Trust it may be provided that
the action of the Trustee in certain respects shall be subject to the
control of ... a third person in no way connected with the trust."
By this means a settlor and his lawyer may recruit the talents
of an advisor without subjecting him to all the responsibilities of a
trustee. Such an advisor is a fiduciary - but only with respect to
the specific assignment given him. He need not hover over the
shoulder of the corporate trustee in other matters; yet his attention
to the special topic assigned is reassurance that the settlor may safe-
ly relinquish control.
That the trustee is well-insulated by this device is made clear
in Reeve v. Chase National Bank.20 There, a power of investment
was retained in the settlor himself. He later yielded to the corpo-
rate trustee's persuasion to buy second mortgages. When a loss en-
16 The leading case is Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830). Its language appears
in the Colorado 'prudent man" law quoted herein, p. 306.
17 3 Scott, Trusts § 227.14 at 1704.
1S Id. § 230.1 at 1721.
19 2 Scott, Trusts 1 222 (2d ed. 1956).
:20 287 N.Y. Supp. 937 (1946).
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sued, the court held that the settlor could not escape the conse-
quences of the power he had reserved and exercised. The case is
notably strong in view of the fact that the mortgages urged by the
bank-trustee were those offered by its own affiliate. Ignoring the
trustee's self-dealing, and viewing the trust instrument, the court
said, "The directions of the settlor were a protection to the trustee."
Reinforcing this position is Hartman's Estate,"2 1 which acknowl-
edged that the settlor might lodge all management powers in a
holder designated for that purpose. The trustee was absolved of any
consequences of the holder's misbehavior not known to him nor
reasonably discoverable by him. From this rule it must follow that
the lodging of some powers in their holder effects corresponding
protection to the trustee.
One authority suggests that a limited power may be specially
restricted, as desired by the settlor, to guard against forseeable con-
tingencies. Thus the holder might be directed to hold common stock
only so long as dividends are maintained in the manner specified.22
It is often best to leave the initiative for guiding affairs of the
estate with the bank-trustee, only establishing the power-holder as
monitor in a narrow field of action. The words of the instrument
may give the holder a power to veto some actions, or compel others.
It has already been stated that the power-holder is a fiduciary
in his small arena, though he is not a trustee because he lacks title.
A clear abuse of his discretion invokes the authority of the courts;
21 331 Pa. 422, 200 AtI.49 (1938).
22 Knecht, Trust Advisor, 94 Trusts and Estates 815 (1955).
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but to have such an effect, the abuse must be clear. This was illus-
trated in a case involving a trust established by John D. Rockefeller
for his daughter and generations to follow. The instrument gave a
committee power to allocate receipts to income or principal of the
trust estate. When the committee assigned all stock dividends to
principal (contrary to the practice approved by New York statute
at the time) the court held that this was not an improper exercise
of the discretion Mr. Rockefeller intended. 23 (The reports of this
case do not disclose the amount involved, but a clue is provided by
the number of attorneys who participated. Nineteen lawyers ap-
peared for the parties below, and sixteen appeared at the court of
appeals to hear the judgment affirmed. None of the ten judges who
dealt with the case ventured to second-guess the financial acumen
of John D. Rockefeller.)
Consistent with the Rockefeller decision, cases reported by
Scott require extreme conduct on the part of a holder to charge him
with abuse of discretion.2 4 Abuse is equated with "dishonesty," "im-
proper motive," or "action beyond the bounds of reasonable judg-
ment."
Settlors should be comforted by the law's insistence that trus-
tees must comply with the directions given by a holder pursuant to
the instrument. The trustee who refuses compliance, or fails to se-
cure the holder's consent when required, has breached his trust.
25
What, then, if the trustee complies and losses follow? Any loss
resulting from good faith compliance with the directions of the hold-
er will not be surcharged to the trustee.26 Further, should it be dis-
covered that a trustee has inadvertently acted without the holder's
approval, the defect may be cured by later ratification from the
holder.
Thus the trustee's liability for investment losses occasioned by
the holder's misguidance can spring only from the trustee's failure
to take corrective action in two situations: (1) If he knows, or
ought to know, that the holder is violating his fiduciary duties; (2)
If changes unanticipated by the settlor, but discovered by the trus-
tee, make compliance with the terms likely to impair the trust.
23 Chase Nat'l. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 271 N.Y. 602, 3 N.E. 2d 205 (1936).
24 2 Scott, Trusts 9 185 (2d ed. 1956).
25 Ibid.
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Even these sources of liability to the trustee may be averted by
terms in the instrument relieving him of a duty to inquire, and ex-
pressly giving sole control to the holder. If the instrument does not
intend such blanket authority in the holder, the trustee's duty is
satisfied by a reasonable amount of inquiry into the propriety of the
investment.
Advisors may, of course, be appointed by the instrument to de-
cide discretionary matters other than selection of investments. In-
genious draftsmen will foresee questions of invasion of'corpus, allo-
cation of receipts to income or principal, and similar matters.
2
1
An advisor, rather than a co-trustee, may be advantageous
where the advisor lives at a distance from the trustee and could not
participate in all trustee actions without undue delays.
The power device prescribed here seems to have gained popu-
larity since 1930. The paucity of appellate decisions on the topic in-
dicates that power-holders stay out of court. They travel under sev-
eral names: "quasi-trustee,"28 "advisory trustee"2 9 and "trust ad-
visor."13
A search of Colorado Supreme Court reports disclosed no cases
hinging on the validity of the powers of a trust advisor. One may
surmise that the strategy has not been employed widely in this
jurisdiction- or that lawyers who employed it have succeeded in
keeping their clients out of litigation. Trust advisors' powers, care-
fully drafted and prudently employed, may gather favor as valu-
able tools for the task of preserving assets peculiarly fitted to the
needs of trust estates.
27 Comment by Austin W. Scott, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 695 (1959).
28 120 A.L.R. 1407 (1939).
29 Gathright's Trustee v. Gant, 276 Ky. 562, 124 S.W. 2d 782 (1939).
30 Kneht, Trust Advisor, 94 Trusts and Estates 815 (1955).
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ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAX PROBLEMS
ARISING UNDER FEDERAL AND COLORADO
ALTERNATE VALUATION STATUTES
By THOMAS P. SWEENEYI
This note was awarded the third prize of $50 in the 1960 writ-
ing competition sponsored by the Denver Clearing House Associa-
tion Trust Officers.
INTRODUCTION
The economic circumstances which caused the passage of
Alternate Valuation Date statutes were well stated in Clark v.
United States:'
The evident purpose was to give some partial relief from
the burden of taxation of estate taxes in the case of sharply
falling market prices between the date of death and a year
thereafter. It was common knowledge that many large
estates had been seriously embarrassed by the coincidence
of heavy estate taxes and falling markets for securities
during the period between the date of the decedent's death
and the time when in ordinary course of administration,
the executor could reasonably realize upon the securities
for the payment of taxes and other costs of administration.
The period of a year was doubtless selected because that is
a customary period allowed for administration and dis-
tribution by an executor.2
When it is pointed out that the first Alternate Valuation Date
Statute was passed in 1935,3 it becomes apparent that such statutes
were enacted to alleviate estate tax problems which were caused
by the depression. In the early 1930's, the value of real and personal
property held in an estate frequently would decline to such an ex-
tent that the value of the gross estate at the time of distribution was
less than the amount of the estate and inheritance taxes payable out
of the corpus of the estate. To overcome this hardship, statutes were
passed which allowed the administrator or executor of an estate to
value the estate as of the date of death or as of one year after death.
However, property distributed during the one year period was still
required to be evaluated as of the date of distributions.
At the outset it must be stated that there has been no Colorado
Supreme Court decision involving the Colorado "Optional Valuation
Date" statute. However, since the only substantial difference be-
tween the Colorado 4 and federal 5 statutes is the method of exer-
cising the election under the statutes, Colorado might follow the
federal court decisions.
t Mr. Sweeney is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 33 F. Supp. 216 (1940).
2 Id. at 218.
3 Rev. Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 202, 49 Stat. 1022.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 138-4-67 (Proposed Supp. 1959).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1 2032.
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PROPERTY INCLUDED IN THE ESTATE
The federal statute provides, "the value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property (except real property situ-
ated outside of the United States) to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death."6
In applying section 2033 when the executor elects, under section
2032 (a) 7 to value the estate as of one year after date of death prob-
lems have arisen in determining the extent of the decedent's interest
in property at the date of his death.
The problem of whether the decedent had a property interest
in rents, dividends, and interest earned by the estate within one
year after decedent's death was settled in Maas v. Higgins.8 The
decedent died on August 30, 1936. In the estate tax return the
executor elected to have the value of the gross estate determined
by valuing it as of one year after decedent's death. The com-
missioner of internal revenue included in the value of the estate
rents, dividends and interest earned by the estate subsequent to
the decedent's death. The Supreme Court, in holding that the com-
missioner of internal revenue had erroneously included in the value
of estate the income earned after decednt's death, stated:
In the appraisal of a decedent's estate, rent or interest ac-
crued to the date of death is properly treated as a capital
asset. So also, on the sale of an interest bearing security,
it is the uniform practice to add to the value of the value
of the obligation, as such, accrued interest to the date of
sale. Since the statute says that, at the option of the execu-
tor, a bond may be valued as of one year subsequent to the
decedent's death, the natural conclusion is that the usual
method of valuation shall be pursued whichever date is
selected. The method always adopted for valuation at death
is the same used in fixing a sale price; that is, to take the
market value of the bond and add accrued interest to the
date of transfer, at the rate stipulated in the instrument.
It is not believed that Congress, in providing for two dates
of valuation, intended that a different method should be
followed if one date were chosen rather than the other.9
A further explanation of the includibility of dividends is neces-
sary because dividends received by the estate may be of such a
nature that the decedent had a property interest in them at the
date of his death. The regulations provide that dividends declared
to stockholders of record on or before date of the decedent's death
and not collected at the date of death constitute a part of the
estate.10 The regulations further provide that if dividends are
declared to stockholders of record after the date of decedent's death
with the effect that the shares of stock at the subsequent valuation
date do not reasonably represent the same included property of the
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 9 2033.





8 312 U.S. 443 (1941); accord, Stuart v. Hassett 41 F. Supp. 905 (1941); Hord v. United Stotes,
40 F. Supp. 697 (1941); Clark v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 216 (1940).
9 Maas v. Higgins, supro note 8, at 448
10Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d)(4) (1958).
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gross estate as existed at the date of the decedent's death are
included property, except to the extent that they are payable out
of earnings of the corporation after the date of the decedent's death.
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. United States" illustrates the
application of the above mentioned regulations. In the Peoples case
the executor elected to value the estate as of one year after the date
of decedent's death. Plaintiff, as executor, received for the estate
$9.25 per share during the year following the death of the decedent
in payment of arrearages on 1,915 shares of United States Steel
Corporation 7% cumulative preferred stock. The dividends are
declared after the decedent's death. The earnings and profits of the
United States Steel Corporation earned after the death of decedent
were sufficient to pay all of the dividends. The Commissioner of
internal revenue required the plaintiff to include the amount of the
dividends in the value of the estate. The court in reversing the Com-
missioner's decision held that where the executor elected to have the
decedent's estate valued for estate tax purposes as of one year after
date of death, dividends received during the year in payment of
arrearages on cumulative preferred stock owned by the estate were
not subject to the estate tax.
A further illustration of the application of the same regulation
is McGehee v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,12 which held that a
stock dividend distributed as a capitalization of income of a corpora-
tion and subsequent to a gift in contemplation of death of the shares
upon which the dividend was declared should not be regarded as a
part of the gift and should not be included in the gross estate of the
deceased donor.
VALUE OF PROPERTY INCLUDED
First to be considered is property distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of within one year after the date of decedent's
death.1 3 Before the value of such included property can be ascer-
tained, a determination of the date of distribution, sale, exchange
or other disposition, mentioned in section 2032 (a) (1),14 must be
made. The regulations set forth the tests for determining the date
of distribution:
Property is considered as "distributed" upon that which occurs
first:
(i) The entry of an order or decree of distribution, if the
order or decree subsequently becomes final;
(ii) The segregation or separation of the property from the
estate or trust so that it becomes unqualifiedly subject
to the demand or disposition of the distributee; or
(iii) The actual paying over or delivery of the property to
the distributee.15
It should be noted that the above regulation determines the
date of distribution by indicating the overt acts which constitute a
distribution.
11 54 F. Supp. 742 (1944).
12 260 F. 2d 818 (1958).
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (a) (1): "In the case of property distributed, sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of, within one year after decedent's death such property shall be valued as of the
dote of distribution, sale, exchange, or other disposition."
14 Ibid.








As an illustration of what is not a distribution, it has been held
that the division of the corpus of a revocable trust, included in the
gross estate of the decedent for federal estate tax, for the purpose
of facilitating the payment of the income therefrom to certain
named individuals for life does not constitute a distribution of prop-
erty within the meaning of section 2032 of the 1954 code.'6
The date of sale, exchange or other disposition, according to the
regulations, is the efective date of the contract, unless there is not
a subsequent substantial performance of the contract. 7 The regu-
lations define the effective date of a contract as the date it is entered
into unless the contract specifies a different date.
It should be pointed out that the valuation of inventory of a
sole proprietorship involves a unique problem. No profit would be
realized upon the sale of inventory items owned at the time of death
and disposed of during the one year period after death. The inven-
tory must be valued for estate tax purposes on the basis of its value
at the date of disposition thereof if within the one year period. This
creates the problem of keeping detailed accounting records to trace
the inventory disposed of within the one year period. 18
Normally, when property included in the gross estate is dis-
tributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of within one year
of the decedent's death it is included at its fair market value on the
date of distribution or other disposition. The value of such property
which is affected by mere lapse of time will be considered below.
Next to be considered is the value of property included in the
gross estate which has not been distributed or otherwise disposed
of within one year after the decedent's death. The code provides
that such property shall be valued as of the date one year after
decedent's death.19
Estate of Hanch2 1 demonstrates how section 2032 (a) (2) has
been applied. In that case the executor elected to value the estate
one year after death. The decedent had a one-third interest in the
estate of his deceased wife, which had not yet been distributed at
the date of his death. Distribution was made to his estate less than
two months after his death. The question before the court was
whether the amount to be included in Charles C. Hanch's estate
was one-third of the value of his wife's estate as it was composed
on October 22, 1946, but valued as of October 22, 1947, of specific
assets distributed to his estate on December 18, 1946. The Tax Court
held that the decedent's interest in his wife's estate must be meas-
ured by one-third of the value of her estate as it was composed on
the date of his death, but valued one year thereafter, rather than by
the specific assets that were subsequently distributed to his estate.
Consideration is now given to includible property which is af-
fected by mere lapse of time. According to section 2032 (a) (3)
such property shall be included at its value as of the time of death
with adjustment for any difference in its value as of the alternate
valuation date not due to a mere lapse of time.
The regulations define property which is affected by mere lapse
16 Rev. Rul. 57-495, 1957 Int. Rev. Bill. No. 43, at 31.







18 Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958 Int. Rev. Bill. No. 35, at 8 throws some light on the problem. See Price,
"Alternate Valuation Dote Problems." [e.g.] N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax. p. 1245.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (a)(2).
20 19 T.C. 65 (1952).
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of time as patents, life estates of persons other than the decedent,
remainders, reversions, and other like properties, interests or
estates.
21
The alternate valuation of a patent may be illustrated best by
an example. Assume that the decedent owned a patent which, on the
date of his death had an unexpired term of ten years and a value
of $100,000. One year after death the patent, because of lapse of
time and other causes, had a value of $80,000. The alternate value
of the patent would be obtained by dividing $80,000 by 0.90 (ratio
of the remaining life of the patent at the alternate date to the re-
maining life of the patent at the date of the decedent's death), and
would, therefore, be $88,888.89.22
The manner for determining the value of life estates, remaind-
ers, and similar interests is stipulated in the regulations:
The values of life estates, remainders, and similar interests
are to be obtained by applying the methods prescribed in
§20.2031-1, using (i) the age of each person, the duration of
whose life may affect the value of the interest, as of the
date of the decedent's death, and (ii) the value of the prop-
erty as of the alternate date..
2
3
Estate of Welliver 2 4 is an illustration of the application of the
above regulations. In the Welliver case, the executrix elected to
value the estate as of one year after death. Among the assets of the
decedent's estate were nineteen single premium annuity contracts.
Each contract provided for the payment of $100 annually to
decedent during his life and after his death to his wife for life. The
amount necessary to purchase nineteen comparable annuity con-
tracts for the life of decedent's wife, computed on the basis of the
annuity table and interest rate currently used by the issuing com-
panies in calculating annuity premiums, was $26,706 on April 14,
1943, the date of decedent's death, and $25,821.20 on April 14, 1944.
If computed on the basis of the annuity table and interest rates
used by the companies when the nineteen contracts were made, the
aggregate premiums for nineteen comparable annuity contracts
for life of decedent's wife would be $21,577 on April 14, 1943, and
$20,886.20 on April 14, 1944. On the estate tax return the nineteen
contracts were included among the assets of the estate; their aggre-
gate value under option was reported as $20,886.20, their value at
death, as $21,557. The Commissioner assigned them a value of
$26,706 in determining the value of the gross estate. In sustaining
the Commissioner's contention, the Tax Court held that as the con-
tracts were interests affected by a mere lapse of time their value
at decedent's death is an amount includible in the gross estate. The
value of the contracts at decedent's death is the amount for which
comparable contracts could have been purchased from the issuing
company under the annuity table and interest rate then used by
it in computing premiums.
21 Treas. Reg. I 20.2032-1(f) (1958).
22 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(f)(2) (1958).
23Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(f)(1) (1958); Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problems," )e.g.I N.Y.U.
17th Inst. on Fed. Tax p. 1245 at 1246-7 states, "To eliminate from the value as of the alternate date,
changes in value due to mere lapse of time, the value of annuities, and of life, remainder and rever-
sionary interests are to be obtained by applying the factor applicable as of the date of death, rather
than as of the alternate date. However, the factor is applied to the reduced value of the property."
24 8 T.C. 165 (1947).
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Estate of Hance2 5 illustrates one possible result where the per-
son whose life expectancy afects the value of the interest dies during
the year period. Hance died on February 22, 1947, survived by his
widow. The executor elected to value Hance's estate as of one year
after date of death. The estate included seven single premium an-
nuity contracts payable to the decedent for life and thereafter to
his widow for life. The widow died on May 15, 1947, at the age of
83 years and 9 months. In the return the contracts were valued at
$44,632.92. This valuation was arrived at by discounting at a rate of
4% the total payments which would have been received by the
widow on the basis of her life expectancy at the time of decedent's
death without regard for the fact that she died on May 15, 1947. The
Commissioner determined that these contracts should be valued on
the basis of the cost of similar policies issued on the date of deced-
ent's death to a female applicant of the same age as the surviving
widow. The total cost of such policies would have been $125,905.27.
The petitioner conceded that the Commissioner had correctly valued
the annuity policies as of the date of decedent's death but contends
that because of the election to have the estate valued as of the date
one year after death, the Commissioner erred in failing to allow an
adjustment for the difference in value as of the later date not due
to mere lapse of time. The Tax Court held that the amount to be
included in the gross estate is the figure representing the payment
actually received by the widow, notwithstanding that as of the op-
tional date the annuities were worthless.
26
It is apparent, that if the executor had not elected to value the
estate as of the atlernate valuation date, the death of Mrs. Hance
would not have affected the value of the annuity, but it would have
been included in her husband's estate valued according to her life
expectancy at the time of Hance's death.
SPECIAL RULES AFFECTING DEDUCTIONS
A section of the code 27 provides that there shall be no deduction
if such deduction is in effect given by the alternate valuation. The
25 18 T.C. 499 (1952).
26 Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problem," [e.g.] N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1245 at 1247.
"The Tax Court held that only the increase in the cost of the annuity between the decedent's death
and the annuitant's death should be included in the decedent's estate. The Court based this conclusion
on the fact that the annuity lost its value due to the annuitant's death, and not to mere lapse of time.
The only loss in value due to mere lapse of time was the difference between the value of the annuity
at the decedent's death and at the annuitant's death, and this was all that could be inlcuded in the
decedent's estate."
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032 (b).
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provisions contained in this section are designed to prevent the
decline in value from resulting in a double deduction, and also
correlate the value with the amount of the deduction. For example,
the executor in valuing the taxable estate can deduct losses from
fire, storm, shipwreck, theft or other casualties.28 But, if alternate
valuation is elected, such losses cannot be taken because the value
of the property one year after death reflects the occurence of these
deductions.
Section 2032 (b) further provides the means for evaluating
property which is the subject of a charitable 9 or marital :t ' deduc-
tion. Such property will be valued for purposes of the deduction
in the following manner: the value as of the date of death will
be adjusted to reflect the value as of the alternate valuation date.
However, if any portion of the difference in value is attributable
to a mere lapse of time, or to the occurrence or non-occurrence of
a contingency adjustment will not be allowed as to this portion.
It is apparent from the language of section 2032 (b) that if the
valuation of property for purposes of the charitable and marital
deduction depends upon the duration of an individual's life, his life
expectancy at the time of the decedent's death should be used, even
though the alternate valuation date is elected and the measuring
life ceases during the year period. The reason for this result is that
the provision dealing with the charitable and marital deduction
eliminates changes in value caused by mere lapse of time and
changes in value resulting from the occurence or non-occurrence
of a contingency. Therefore, when the person dies during the year
period this is the occurrence of a contingency which is to be dis-
regarded.3 1
TIME OF ELECTION
If the executor or administrator desires to take advantage of
the provisions of the federal and Colorado alternate valuation
statutes, he must so elect because these provisions do not operate
automatically. The election, in the case of federal estate tax, must
be indicated on the estate tax return, which, under section 6075
and 6018,1- is required to be filed within fifteen months from the
date of the decedent's death or within the period of any extension
of time granted by the district director under section 6081Y. How-
ever, in the case of Colorado Inheritance Tax, the election is exer-
cised by filing with the inheritance tax commissioner, within fifteen
months from the death of the decedent or any written extension
therefrom granted by the commissioner, a supplement to the sworn
statement required by statute,1' 4 setting forth the values applicable
to each item of property included in the estates as of the alternate
valuation date.1 5
After the expiration of the above mentioned times no election
may be exercised, nor may a previous election be revoked. Also,
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2054.
29 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
31 See Price, "Alternate Valuation Dote Problems," N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1245.
32 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, H§ 6075, 6018.
33 lt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6018 (a).
34 Cola. Rev. Stat. 9 138-4-42 (1953).
35 Supro note 4.
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if the election is exercised it applies to all of the property included
in the gross estate.
3 6
Rosenfield v. United States3 7 demonstrates the binding effect
of the election. In that case the court held that where the election
to have the gross estate of the decedent valued for estate tax pur-
poses as of the date one year after death was made upon full dis-
closure of the facts, such election was binding upon the estate and
could not be revoked after the expiration of the time for filing the
return on the ground that the election was made upon a mistake as
to the consequences of such election.
Estate of Downe4 illustrates what constitutes a timely filing of
the election. The estate tax return of Henry S. Downe was due on
March 8, 1940. The return was mailed on March 8, 1940, but not
received in the collector's office until March 9, 1940. The Tax Court
held that the return must reach the collector's office on or before
the date on which the return is required to be filed and therefore
there was not a timely filing on the return. Consequently, Downe's
estate could not be valued as of one year after the date of death.
The Downe case should be contrasted with Doriss et al. v.
Commissioner.9 In the Doriss case, the due date for filing of the
estate tax return was April 14, 1938. On the morning of that date
an estate tax return was mailed from New York City to Albany,
and addressed to the collector of internal revenue at the latter
city, whose offices were in the post office building. He main-
tained a post office box and sent for his mail several times a day,
usually not after 2:30 P.M. His office hours were from 9 A.M. to
4:30 P.M. The return reached the Albany post office at 5 P.M. on
April 14, and was placed in the collector's post office box. It was not
called for by the collector until the following morning and was
stamped received as of April 15. In this return the executor of the
estate elected to have the gross estate valued as of a date one year
after decedent's death. The Tax Court held that when the return
in question had reached the collector's post office box, it had gone
as far on its way to the collector as the post office department
would take it. Thereafter it was subject to the control of the col-
lector and available to him at any time. Under the circumstance
shown here, the return was mailed in ample time to reach the office
of the collector on the due date and was therefore timely filed with-
in the meaning of the controlling regulation.
36 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b)(2) (1958).
37 254 F. 2d 940 (1958); Certiorari denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958).
38 3 T.C. 967 (1943); Estate of Flinchbaugh 1 T.C. 653 (1943).
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When it is called to mind that the income tax basis of property
included in the gross estate is its value at the date of death, or the
alternate valuation date if alternate valuation is used, it becomes
apparent that in addition to the usual estate tax consequences aris-
ing from the alternate valuation, there are income tax consequences
which may outweigh the estate tax consequences.
When Congress added this election to the law, it merely intend-
ed it as a relief measure for those estates which had suffered severe
declines in value. In spite of the fact that it was enacted as a relief
measure, the use of this election now presents problems undoubt-
edly not contemplated at the time of its passage. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider, in addition to relative values, the inclusion of
assets, their subsequent basis, income tax consequences and the ef-
fect on the beneficiary's legacies.
4 0
40 See Price, "Alternate Valuation Date Problem," N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax p. 1245 at 1265.
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CASE COMMENT
LABOR RELATIONS - CONTRACTS -
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM
John L. Lewis and others, as trustees for a union welfare and
retirement fund, brought an action against Benedict Coal Corpora-
tion for payments allegedly due as the result of a collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into between Benedict and The United
Mine Workers of America. The company cross-claimed, asserting
that the contract providing for the payments had been violated by
the union and that the company was entitled to set-off damages
arising from this breach against payments into the fund. The trial
court found that the payments were due the trustees as alleged, but
also found that Benedict was entitled to damages for the breach of
the collective bargaining agreement by the union. The judgment
against the union was given immediate execution with the proceeds
to be paid into the registry of the court, while the judgment for the
trustees was limited to satisfaction from the fund so created. The
effect of this judgment, therefore, was allowance of the set-off
against the third-party beneficiary of contract damages arising from
a breach by the promisee. This decision was affirmed, except as to
the amount of damages, by the Circut Court of Appeals, but was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it was against
sound labor policy to allow such set-off. Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corporation, 80 Sup. Ct. 489 (1960).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in an excellently reasoned dissent,
recognized the fact that this decision is against the great weight of
authority of contract law and that sound labor policy did not re-
quire this decision.
The general rule is well established that the rights of a third-
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party beneficiary of a contract are subject to all of the equities of
the original contract.t The early decisions allowing a third-party
beneficiary to bring an action in his own name were reasoned on
the basis of a substitution of parties, the beneficiary for the prom-
isee.2 These cases have held that the right of the beneficiary to en-
force the contract is subject to all the equities arising out of the
contract. 3 State courts,4 as well as federal courts,!, have recognized
this limitation on the rights of the beneficiary.
In recent decisions, the courts have restricted the beneficiary's
right of recovery by placing the same limitations upon this recovery
as are present in actions upon the original contract.6 Professor Cor-
bin has stated in his treatise on contracts that it is probably the just
view to make the beneficiary subject to counterclaims against the
promisee. 7 This "just view" is also taken by the American Law In-
stitute in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts." The Court,
however, rejected these views as not applicable to the situation at
hand and proceeded to decide the case upon the basis of a sound
labor policy.9
The contract in question was made pursuant to the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 195010 and provided for pay-
ments into the welfare fund by each employer. These payments
were to be made into the fund on the basis of each ton of coal mined
by the individual mine operators. Two relevant clauses are con-
tained in the contract, one providing that the no-strike clause is a
part of the consideration for the contract, and the other, that the
agreement is an integrated instrument and that the respective pro-
visions are interdependent. The court does not deny that this would
be sufficient to create a third-party beneficiary contract subject to
set-off under normal circumstances, but states that it is not applica-
ble to the situation at hand. This conclusion is based partly upon
two provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and partly upon an alleged
interest in the trust fund by the employer.1t
One provision of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that any money
judgment against a labor organization is enforceable against the
organization as an entity only, not against the assets of the individ-
ual members.12 This provision was a result of the Danbury Hatters
case 1 where the individual union members were held liable for the
debts of the union. The amendment in question was passed, after
several states had passed statutes which threatened a recurrence of
1 Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891); Assets Realization Co. v. Cordon, 72 Utah
597, 272 Pac. 204 (1928).
2 Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 25 Am. Rep. 195 (1877).
3 Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N.Y. 30, 39 Am. Rep. 617 (1881).
4 Union City Realty and Trust Co. v. Wright, 145 Ga. 730, 89 S.E. 822 (1916); Clay v. Woodrum,
45 Kan. 116, 25 Pac. 619 (1891); Greene v. McDonald, 75 Vt. 93, 53 Atl. 332 (1902); Farmers State
Bank v. Nicholson, 36 Wyo. 221, 254 Pac. 134 (1927).
5 United States v. Inorganics Inc., 109 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1952); Fish v. First Not. Bank of
Seattle, Wash., 150 F. 524 (9 Cir. 1907).
6 United States v. Inorganics Inc., 109 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1952); Petty v. Sloan, 197 Tenn.
630, 277 S.W.2d 355 (1955); Fulmer v. Goldfarb, 171 Tenn. 218, 101 S.W.2d 1108 (1937).
7 4 Corbin, Contracts, § 819 (1951).
8 A.L.I., Restatement, Contracts § 140, illustration 5 (1932).
9 "Finally a consideration which is not present in the case of other third-party beneficiary con-
tracts is the impact of the national labor policy." 80 Sup. Ct. at 495.
10 25 L.R.R.M. 16.
11 "The Promisor's interest in the third party here goes far beyond the mere performance of its
promise to that third party, i.e., beyond the payment of royalty." 80 Sup. Ct. at 495.
12 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(b), 61 Stat. 156 (1947) as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 185(b).
13 Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Loewe v. Savings
Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916).
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this type of liability to the individual members of the union, with
the express intent of giving the advantages of limited liability to
members of a labor union without the need for the incorporation
of the union.
14
The other provision' does not relate to the contractual capacity
of the union, but instead, to the purposes for which the trust fund
shall be used. These provisions relate to the creation of the fund
and its subsequent use, but a search of the congressional record and
the act does not disclose any intention or provision which would
negate the rules applicable to legal contracts formed through the
time-honored process of offer and acceptance. 16
Local unions and their members are bound by contracts ne-
gotiated by their union bargaining agents, and they do not have the
right to disregard the terms of a contract made on their behalf.
17
The employers are bound by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement to the same extent that the union and its members are."
It therefore follows that either party must substantially perform
his contractual promises before he will be allowed to rely on the
contract or seek its enforcement.' Under these circumstances, it is
clear that the union could not avoid liability for damages occasioned
by the employees breach, and might be deprived of its right to en-
force the contract. .' Should the third-party beneficiary be given a
greater power of enforcement than that held by the party who
created the beneficiary? Sound contract law says that it should not,
but the Court disregarded these principles and allowed the bene-
ficiary to exercise his judicially-created right at the expense of the
Benedict Cpal Corporation.
In the leading case of Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama,"' the power of a federal court to create a body of
federal substantive law for labor relations was first recognized. This
power was granted by Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
22
the same section which the court was considering in attempting to
determine the rights of the parties under the present contract. It is
ironic that the section which created this power could be the first
crack in its foundation.
Since it is impossible to honestly reconcile the Supreme Court's
decision with sound contract law, we must assume that the court
was exercising its discretion in an attempt to shape a body of fed-
eral labor law. The question arises whether it is necessary to aban-
don the well established precepts of the law in an effort to form a
policy for governing labor relations. One of the leading authorities
on labor relations does not believe that such an abandonment of
sound law is wise and warns against such a procedure, fearing the
14 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15.
15 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(c)(
5
), 61 Stat. 157 (1947) as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c)(5).
1692 Cong. Rec. 4892-94, 4899, 5181, 5345-46; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52; 93 Cong.
Rec. 4678, 4746-47.
17 Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
1s Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 269 F.2d 327 (4 Cir. 1959).
19 Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Moron v. Lasette, 221 App. Div. 118,
223 N.Y. Supp. 283 (1927).
20 Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
21 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
22 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hcrtley Act) 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947) as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 185(o).
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abandonment of the well-founded legal precepts will result in a
weakening of the entire legal and social system.
2 3
Avoiding contracts on the basis of "public policy" is undoubted-
ly within the rights of the Court in this situation, but we must ex-
amine the advisability of such a decision. " [Ti he very meaning of
public policy is the interest of others than the parties, and that in-
terest is not to be at the mercy of the defendant alone. '2 4 The same
rules of law should be applied to all persons, insignificant individ-
uals as well as vast and powerful labor organizations. The rights
of the parties should not be determined by their power, monetarily
or at the polls, but should be founded upon sound precepts of law
which are applicable to large and small alike. It cannot be imagined
that Congress intended an abandonment of all substantive law
when empowering the courts to create a body of federal labor law.
[I]t must not be forgotten that the right of private con-
tract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and that
the usual and most important function of courts of justice
is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than to enable
parties thereto to escape from their obligation on the pre-
text of public policy, unless it clearly appear that they con-
travene public right or the public welfare.
25
This decision appears to be based upon strong union policy, not
a doctrine of sound public policy. Benedict entered into the con-
tract with the belief that it would be enforced as drafted and relied
upon this belief in its negotiations with the union. The coal com-
panies specifically provided in the contract, "This Agreement is an
integrated instrument and its respective provisions are interdepend-
ent" with the expectation that the contract would be enforced as a
whole, or not at all. To enforce the contract against one party there-
to, while allowing the other party to twist the terms and escape,
seems to contravene "public policy" to a greater extent than would
enforcement of the contract as it was drafted by the parties.
A consistent application of the doctrine set forth by the Court
might lead to a labor policy which would be disastrous to free en-
terprise. A breach by the union will not excuse the employer from
the contract, but will render him liable for payments into the fund
for coal mined by non-union laborers while the contract is in effect.
These payments will be even more repugnant to justice if they are
based upon time rather than production. In either case, the em-
ployer will be forced to pay amounts into a retirement fund for the
benefit of persons whom he no longer employs, or be forced to re-
tain substandard performance by his employees. To escape these
alternatives, the employer must close his business for the life of the
collective bargaining agreement. Whatever his choice, the employer
will have no right to set-off the damages occasioned by the breach,
against his payments into the union retirement fund. This type of
application will not only be costly to the employer, but will place
him at the mercy of the union in collective bargaining sessions.
The major consideration given by labor unions for collective
bargaining agreements is the promise to refrain from slowdowns
23 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1958).
24 Beosley v. Texas and Pacific R. Co., 191 U.S. 492, 498 (1903).
25 Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Co. v. Vogit, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900).
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and work stoppages. If the union members are allowed to violate
this promise and yet enforce the rights which are dependent upon
it, management has gained nothing from the contract, but has in-
curred a substantial liability because of it. Such a violation of the
basic requisites of contract cannot be reconciled, economically or
socially, with the good of the nation or a sound labor policy.
This is an unfortunate decision and will perhaps be strictly
construed by the courts to the exact factual situation. Those who
value the advantages of free enterprise operated by private capital,
as opposed to rule by the proletariat, must hope that the growing
power of organized labor has not yet reached that point where the
laws, which have stood the test of time and battering of social in-
terests, are no longer applicable to labor while they continue to
govern the other members of our society.
Steve LeSatz, Jr.
BAR BRIEFS
TAX ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
MARTIN ATLAS, WASHINGTON, D.C.
(An address given under the auspices of the Taxation Law Section
of the Colorado Bar Association under the chairmanship of T. Raber
Tayler, Denver, Colorado at its 61st Annual Convention at the
Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, October, 1959.)
Real estate, because it has a certain innate flexibility, lends it-
self to effective tax planning. Unlike the business in which one
must go on selling his product and replacing it with inventory, re-
gardless of other circumstances, the real estate transaction can be
both tailored as to type of transaction and as to time of transaction.
This constitutes the basic ingredient for good tax planning. We
shall consider tax planning within the framework of existing law
and the present rate structure. While there is a certain inherent
thinking that through postponement, good things are going to hap-
pen through rate reductions, we should not make that assumption.
Rates have a tendency to creep upward rather than downward, and
mere postponement in the hope of getting a lower rate structure is
not a very fruitful approach to the subject. So we shall consider
the problem within the present rate structure, with the assumption,
however, that the rate structure of the future will not be higher.
Let us assume that things will remain as they are.
Like Gaul, all of tax planning can be divided into three main
categories. You either split your income and by this fragmentation
method reduce the overall burden because small pieces under a
graduated rate structure add up to a lesser tax; you try to convert
your income into a capital gains pattern because of the favorable
rate granted to capital gains; or you attempt procedures that will
defer the tax and time your transactions for the best tax results.
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In examining the first category, that is the subject of splitting
big ones into little ones, we are all familiar, with the use of multi-
ple corporations. This is probably the most useful and most fre-
quently used device for dividing income. We have also heard that
the Treasury is not happy with the use of multiple corporations by
individual taxpayers, and it is no secret that they are gunning very
actively for an approach which would tend to discourage the use
of 25, 50 or even 100 corporations by a single taxpayer. To the best
of my knowledge, there is very little that the Treasury can do about
multiple corporations at present, so long as the corporations con-
tinue doing real business at arm's length under suitable business
terms, whether they be with each other or with the outside world.
The big problem that arises for taxpayers who use multiple
corporations lies in the fact that taxpayers like to have their cake
and eat it, too. They like to consider multiple corporations as sep-
arate entities, but through loose thinking, loose accounting, loose
advice, they do not always treat these entities as separate corpora-
tions. They comingle funds, and turn notes back and forth without
adequate interest, without security, without time of payment; the
money both is and is not in one company. That is fatal now and
will continue to be even more fatal as this type of transaction is in-
creasingly scrutinized. But for those who are willing to endure the
additional overhead that is necessary to maintain separate books of
account and to make sure that their dealings with their own com-
panies are on the same basis as dealings with a stranger's company,
the multiple corporation continues, at least in the foreseeable fu-
ture, to offer very important means for dividing income.
Trusts and gifts also offer important approaches to the subject,
particularly the short term trust, the ten-year trust, or the even
shorter charitable trust. The ten-year trust is a very important de-
vice because you can separate yourself from the income, and yet
not separate yourself from the property forever. There is a small
price to pay for the separation during a limited period of time, but
during that time you may exercise full managerial authority over
property as long as that control does not inure to your own benefit.
A far more frequent problem than either of those just men-
tioned is the one that arises from the question of what is the status
of someone who deals with real estate fairly frequently? The prob-
lem is not with the out-and-out real estate dealer nor with the out-
and-out investor. The real problem relates to the fellow who gets
into the real estate business perhaps backwards, buys and sells
something today, and makes some money on it and as a result of
that suddenly finds the occupation mushrooming. It is difficult to
ascertain when an investor becomes a dealer. Is it after two trans-
actions, six transactions, or fourteen transactions? What is the
magic number? It is impossible to tell. It is clear, however, that
for one who wishes to maintain an investor status, certain things
must not be done. He must not advertise himself as a real estate
man; he must not hold a broker's license; he must not have letter-
heads that say "Real Estate"; he must have none of the outside in-




On the other hand, it is recognized that almost everything in
this world is for sale, so that it is not necessary that one keep prop-
erty forever to demonstrate that it is an investment. A dealer may
also be an investor and so we may have the same type problem
mentioned before with the small multi-corporation taxpayer. If a
dealer is not careful, lack of caution may bring about his downfall.
A dealer may in fact get capital gains on investment property.
The burden in such case is more heavily on the taxpayer than when
he is not otherwise a dealer. In order to get capital gains, property
which is not bought for resale should be placed in an investment
account and there should be no comingling of accounts so that what
is sold is always held out to be investment property whereas what
is not sold is held out to be inventory.
Subdivision of land into lots is fatal so far as investment status
is concerned. The Code does have one provision allowing subdivi-
sion of land, the first five lots, and so on, but this is very limited in
both scope and usefulness, and it is not something which is of much
help to the man who is involved in real estate transactions.
What is often overlooked, however, is the fact that the sale of
acreage which can enjoy capital gains treatment may very often
result in a larger net profit after tax than subdivision subject to
ordinary income tax rates. There is a great inclination by people
to subdivide and enjoy the higher per lot price which can be re-
ceived from subdivided land. But if you put pencil to paper, unless
there is a tremendous difference, much of this difference and even
more of the difference on occasion is erased by subjection of the
income to ordinary rates rather than to capital gains rates.
The largest avenue for tax planning in real estate, however, is
in none of the things mentioned above. The real avenue for tax
planning is in proper timing of your transactions.
The reason for this is the peculiarity of the law with respect to
the treatment of gains and losses from real estate. There is first of
all ordinary investment property which is the capital asset. There
is then the magic 1231 asset, which is real estate used in a trade or
business but not held primary for sale. With respect to such prop-
erty held over six months, the gain is treated as a capital gain,
whereas the loss, if any, is treated as an ordinary loss.
The important point to remember, however, is that with re-
spect to 1231 assets, losses and gains must be netted out before there
is either a net gain or a net loss. Appropriate timing therefore,
would show that maximum advantage results if it is possible to get
all of your gains into one year and thereby have the gains subject
only to the capital gains taxes, and all of your losses into another
year so that all of your losses enjoy treatment as ordinary losses.
Now, the trick, of course, is how do you do it. And the answer is,
very often, it cannot be done. But in a great number of cases it can
be do-!e, and it is with respect to those cases that we focus our at-
tention.
First of all, there is always the possibility of postponing the
closing date. If your transaction occurred near the end of the year
and if it is desirable, you might be able to arrange to close in 1960
as easily as in 1959. Or, if it is the other way around, you might be
able to push up the closing date from 1960 to 1959. Whichever way
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is best for the taxpayer is, of course, the method to select, if busi-
ness considerations will permit it.
As against postponement of closing, there is also postponement
of payment. There is first, the installment method of payment,
which spreads out your gains over the period of payment. There is
no inherent tax saving by spreading out your payments through
the installment basis; however, you do report it over a number of
years which gives you the opportunity in future years to have off-
setting losses against your profits and thus reduce your total tax.
Its main advantage is, therefore, in the opportunity to have a sec-
ond, third and fourth look as the years proceed in offsetting your
taxable income.
An installment sale may occur even though there is no initial
payment in the year of sale; hence, none of the income need be
picked up in the year of sale and all of the income may be deferred
to a later year.
There is also the possibility of using non-negotiable notes, in
real estate transactions. The obvious benefit of using the non-
negotiable note is that, since it is not negotiable, it has no market
value. Because it has no market value, no gain or loss can be de-
termined until afteF the entire cost has been recouped. This, as dis-
tinguished from the installment basis sale, does not require you to
pro-rate your profit over the years of payment, but permits you to
postpone recognition of any gain until you have recouped your en-
tire loss.
The shortcomings of a non-negotiable note is in the very term
'non-negotiable." You have only a piece of paper for the term of
the transaction. Here again, one must be balanced against the other,
but it does offer the opportunity for deferring completely the rec-
ognition of any gain until the entire cost has been recouped.
A similar effect is obtained by the use of escrows and contracts
for deeds, where in fact nothing happens until the terms of the
escrow are met or the entire payment is obtained and the deed is
released.
Still another method is the use of a ground lease. The advan-
tage of such a transaction is that it separates the gain from sale of
the ground and the improvements on the ground. Since the ground
itself is not sold in the first instance, the amount of gain thus rec-
ognized is reduced. At a future date, the ground may be sold to
the home owner, and then the gain with respect to the ground is
recognized. It separates into two transactions what ordinarily pass-
es as one transaction.
The important thing, however, is that all of these procedures
offer the opportunity to balance gains and losses in the appropriate
years so that the combination gives the minimum total tax.
An important but not too widely used type of transaction, but
one which is increasing in popularity, is the tax-free exchange.
Now, here again you have got to cope with the client. The client in
a real estate transaction is basically a person of action; he wants to
buy or he wants to sell. It is generally not his habit to trade for
other property or to inquire whether the type of property to be
traded will meet the necessary tests.
The essence of it is, however, that if the opportunity exists, the
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tax-free exchange is an important means of not only postponing
tax, but more important, offers a means of expecting transactions
which might otherwise not be possible because of the intervention
of the tax bite. If the property is such that it is investment proper-
ty to your client, he may exchange it for other property, and thus
postpone any tax on the transaction until disposition of the new
piece of property. In a period of inflation in the real estate market,
this offers a person the opportunity to upgrade his property for the
longest period of time without the intervention of any tax to in-
terrupt the process. And if he is lucky enough to die before the
sale, then the income tax folks will never catch up with him. In
many cases that is exactly what has happened. If there is a con-
tinually rising market, there is no real need for people to sell out-
right if they can do as well on an exchange.
Let us now turn to some of the more specific problems. One of
these is the importance of real estate in protecting against some of
the tax traps that exist for taxpayers.
Particular reference is made to personal holding companies and
to the surtax on accumulated surplus. The big problem, especially
with respect to personal holding companies, is that very often a
client finds himself with a personal holding company without
knowing that he was walking into this situation. This can happen
very easily where the business of the firm was such that no active
sales occurred in a year and the only income that came in during
the year was interest and dividends. This is not what was intended,
but this is what happened, and the client may very well find him-
self with a personal holding company.
The best protection against a personal holding company is a
piece of income-producing real estate, because the personal holding
company provisions do not apply if more than 50 percent of the
gross income of a corporation is derived from rents. The idea is to
have a piece of property which has very high gross rents included
as an asset of the corporation. Whether it has any net rent is ir-
relevant for the moment; the important thing is for it to have high
gross rents. With high gross rents, your client may transfer to his
incorporated pocketbook his stocks and bonds and enjoy his capital
gain without being subjected to the personal holding company pro-
visions. If, as in many cases, particularly with FHA 608 projects,
there is very little net income derived from the real estate. In effect,
what happens is that stocks and bonds may be placed into a cor-
porate pocketbook, but the personal holding company provisions
which were designed to prevent this from happening are inopera-
tive because of the existence of real estate as an asset of the cor-
poration.
In the case of a surtax on accumulated profits, a similar attrac-
tion exists with respect to the existence of real estate, since the ac-
cumulation of funds for the payment of a mortgage is an acceptable
reason for accumulating reserves, even though they are not neces-
sary for the immediate payment of the obligation. Moreover, these
funds need not be kept sterile; they may be invested, but they must,
of course, be invested in relatively liquid types of investments. Here
again, the opportunity to rebut exists for the enthusiastic Revenue
Agent who comes in and always looks for the last line on the balance
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sheet to see whether a surtax could possibly be asserted, either hop-
ing to collect the tax, or more likely using it as a lever for negotia-
tions on other problems which exist. In such a case, it is always
nice to know that the lever can't lift anything.
Undoubtedly, the most important of the deductions for real
estate purposes is the depreciation allowance. We are now living
in a rather topsy-turvy world, where you find people buying prop-
erty not because there is anything inherently good about the prop-
erty, but because it has a large depreciation allowance which off-
sets income from other sources, and in effect creates a pocket of tax
exempt income.
There is a great inclination to take as much depreciation as
possible in the earliest years of an asset's life. This has come to
such a point that people are now doing it without thinking. And
in this field, at least, anything you do without thinking is almost
sure to be wrong. The reason for this is that in the earlier years you
may not have maximum income from your property, and while the
depreciation may not necessarily go to waste, because of loss carry-
overs, and so on, nevertheless it may serve your purposes better to
take a lesser amount, in those early years by not using, say the dou-
ble declining balance and thus postponing a greater amount of your
depreciation to a later period.
The field of repairs versus capital expenditures is a hopeless
mess, no tax return relating to real estate ownership has ever been
examined without the Revenue Agent coming up with certain in-
voices which you think fit into the repair category, and which he
thinks fits into the capital expenditure category. The chances are
that you are both wrong with respect to some of the invoices. The
facts of life are that taxpayers try to claim everything they pos-
sibly can as repairs while the government tries to claim everything
it can as capital expenditures. The argument has lost some of its
momentum in the light of more liberal depreciation allowances.
Nevertheless, this is an avenue in which there is no real law; it is
a matter which is simply negotiation.
The "thin corporation" is another feature which is very peculiar
to real estate. Real estate as a whole is a peculiar type of invest-
ment because in practically no other field may you deal in such
large amounts with so little money that is your own. The effect is
multiplied by attempts at very thin corporations. The cases on this
continue to mount. The magic number of 4 to 1 is a safe test. Noth-
ing has changed that recently, and it continues to be an adequate
test.
Condemnation is on the increase these days, with increased
public services and the need for more roads and schools. We are in
somewhat a better condition now with respect to the reinvestment
of condemnation awards than we were several years ago, because
we are no longer up against the very tight rule that the funds must
be reinvested in "similar" property. These funds may now be rein-
vested in property "similar or related in service or use." We do not
yet have any clear definition of what the new standard really
means, but we know that it is a broader definition than "similar
property," and to the best of my knowledge any real estate will
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now fit the test for reinvestment of proceeds of condemnation of
other real estate.
One booby trap which clients should not step into is the neces-
sity for the reinvestment of the proceeds and not merely the gain.
This may seem elementary and obvious, but it is surprising how
many people have the impression that all that need be reinvested
is the profit made on the condemnation. Of course, that is not so.
The entire proceeds must be reinvestment. But not all the proceeds
must be invested in cash. A piece of property which cost the amount
of the proceeds will qualify even though it is subject to a mortgage
and the cash investment is much less. This is of significant impor-
tance because it permits the taxpayer to have available to him a
substantial amount of cash even though he meets the test of rein-
vesting the condemnation award. Losses on condemnation, if such
things occur, are treated as 1231 losses.
Where severance damages are involved, they are not part of
the condemnation award. Experience has shown that where sever-
ance damages are also clearly indicated condemning authorities will
be fairly liberal in dividing the total amount as between severance
damages and condemnation award if this will contribute toward an
amicable settlement of the problem.
To the extent that part of a condemnation award can be shifted
to severance damages, the opportunity exists then to merely reduce
the basis for the remaining property to the extent of the damages.
This has a twofold happy effect. First, it releases cash in the hands
of the taxpayer in the form of severance damages. Secondly, it is
necessary to reinvest a much smaller amount because the con-
demnation award has been reduced to the extent that the severance
damage has been increased.
In the last analysis, there is much more that can be done in
the field of preventive law than in the field of remedial law, but
it is sometimes an impossible task to get the client to come in to ask
you beforehand, "What shall we do when we do something?" The
more likely situation is for him to come in after he has signed the
contract and ask you, "How do we get capital gains on this now?"
This is always late in the day. The responsibility remains with the
lawyer to try to educate his clients to come in to see him before the
transaction is consummated. If he can get across to them that there
is far more that he can do for them if they will do this, even though
it seems like paying a doctor for keeping you well, he can do a bet-
ter job for them, and in the long run they will be happier with the
outcome.
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